

"TIOCFÁIDH ÁR LÁ, OUR DAY WILL COME"

Tracing the Origins of Ireland's Support for Palestine



A protest led by the Ireland-Palestine Solidarity Campaign (IPSC). [1]

ON THE NEXT PAGE

Solidarity Mural featuring the flags of Ireland and Palestine. [2]

by **Alyssa Durnil**, St. Edward's University '20

Written for **History Capstone: Writing British History**

Advised by **Professor Lauren Banko**

Edited by **Louie Lu, Daevan Mangalmurti, and Natalie Simpson**



تضامن

Solidarity

R.O.W.S

INTRODUCTION

THERE ARE TWO richly painted walls on each side of the intersection of Beechmount Avenue and Falls Road in Belfast, Northern Ireland. The smaller wall, visible on the right-hand side as one enters Beechmount Avenue, today commemorates the role of women in the first Irish parliament. But that mural is only the most recent in a line of at least twenty-three that have covered the wall and illustrated the concerns of residents of this heavily Catholic portion of Belfast over the years.¹

During the Troubles, the period from the 1960s to the 1990s during which Irish republicans sought to unify the island of Ireland, Beechmount Avenue was better known as RPG Avenue, “after the rocket-propelled grenade launcher often fired from there.”² It was in 1982, during these years of violence, that the first mural in Northern Ireland with an international theme was painted on the Beechmount wall. Fittingly, it depicted “two male insurgents, from the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] and IRA [Irish Republican Army], jointly holding aloft a Russian rocket-propelled grenade launcher, a weapon that both groups used. Underneath was the slogan ‘One struggle.’”³ Whether groups like the PLO and IRA were considered terrorists, guerrillas, or freedom fighters was a matter of perspective. Initially, the IRA sought to vindicate their own violent political opposition by aligning themselves with similar movements around the globe as a means of portraying Irish republicanism as part of an international struggle against imperialism.

The partition of Ireland in 1920 created a fissure between the North and the South, and two Irish identities began to emerge as Irish collective memory was interpreted differently in accordance with current events. Elisabetta Viggiani asserts that “opposing public narratives of national identification [...] victimhood, moral

justification for the use of violence and stigmatization of the adversary are projected by means of careful use of imagery, symbols, language and a process of selective remembering and social amnesia.”⁴ In Northern Ireland, republicans sought to replicate the Irish independence movement of the early twentieth century in hopes of unifying the Emerald Isle. Taking notes from the Celtic Revival, which “provided the basis for the nationalists’ political movement” of the 1910s and 1920s, Irish republicans began adopting Gaelic phrases as a means of promoting cultural nationalism.⁵

In the mid to late twentieth century, Irish nationalist symbols, images, language, and flags began to be applied to or used in conjunction with left-wing nationalist movements across the world. The phrase “Tiocfaidh ár lá,” a Gaelic chant which translates to “Our day will come,” was popularized in Northern Ireland in the 1970s, the early years of the Troubles. This phrase has since been used in reference to similar revolutionary movements such as the Palestinian nationalist movement. The phrase signifies both hope and retribution: a promise that these ethnic groups will one day be free from foreign occupation of their homelands. This sense of a shared history stemming from parallel experiences is what defines the Irish-Palestinian connection. Ireland’s support for the creation of an independent Palestinian state was first championed by the Provisional Irish Republican Army, which worked in conjunction with the Palestine Liberation Organization in the early 1970s, and by Irish civilians who campaigned for the government of Ireland to support Palestinian self-determination over Israeli settler colonialism. Following the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975, when Irish soldiers were deployed to South Lebanon as peacekeepers for the United Nations, accusations of excessive force by Israeli soldiers against members of the Irish battalion inflamed tensions between Ireland and Israel, inadvertently reinforcing pro-Palestinian sentiments in Irish society. In response to the Palestine Liberation Organization’s efforts to disassociate itself from terrorist networks and appeal to

1 “Beechmount/Falls Corner,” Extramural Activity, <https://extramuralactivity.com/beechemountfalls-corner/>.

2 Danny Devine, “Growing Up in Belfast: ‘I Saw British Soldiers Holding Guns Every Day so I Must Have Copied Them,’” *The Guardian*, Dec. 1, 2017.

3 Bill Rolston, “The Brothers on the Walls’: International Solidarity and Irish Political Murals,” in *Journal of Black Studies* 39, no. 3 (Thousand Oaks, Illinois: SAGE Publications, 2009), 461.

4 Elisabetta Viggiani, *Talking Stones: The Politics of Memorialization in Post-Conflict Northern Ireland* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2014), 7.

5 Erik David Nelson, “Memory, Narrative, and Identity Shifts in Modern Ireland,” in *Undergraduate Honors Theses* (Williamsburg: William & Mary, 2016), 34.

European countries through diplomatic channels, Ireland called for a sovereign Palestinian state and led the European Economic Community to endorse Palestinian self-determination, thus enshrining in Irish foreign policy a steadfast commitment to human rights, international law, justice, and peace.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

SCHOLARLY RESEARCH ON Ireland's foreign relations with Palestine and Israel is rather limited. Ireland's role as a neutral power in foreign conflicts through the twentieth century may explain why twentieth century Irish historians generally focus on Ireland's domestic affairs. The Irish War of Independence and the subsequent Irish Civil War, followed by the Troubles, present numerous critical research opportunities. Research on Ireland's foreign policy tends to focus on the country's prominent role in the European Union and the United Nations "despite its small size and location on the margins of the European continent, its policy of military neutrality, and its complex and often contradictory relationship with the United Kingdom."⁶ In Palestine, instability of the Middle East combined with the Palestinian refugee crisis has severely hindered academic research, as archival material may have been lost, destroyed, or difficult to preserve. The most accessible resources concerning Palestinians typically cover political matters; therefore, this paper does not seek to compare Irish and Palestinian cultures as it would be difficult to obtain a complete picture.

The first comprehensive scholarly attempt to analyze Irish-Palestinian relations was undertaken by Rory Miller, a professor at Georgetown University in Qatar who continues to be the leading scholar on this issue. Miller's research analyzes Ireland's relations with Israel and Palestine since 1948, when Ireland formally declared itself to be a republic and when the state of Israel was established. Miller argues the following:

The nature of the Irish struggle for independence from Britain [...] created an innate Irish hostility towards partition as a solution to territorial conflict [...] Combined with [the] belief that Ireland could claim a unique perspective on the Arab-Jewish conflict was the conviction that Ireland occupied a unique, distinctly moral, place in the international system that gave it both a right and a duty to contribute to the search for peace and harmony in international affairs.⁷

Lacking in Miller's research is a thorough examination of the IRA's role in shaping Irish-Palestinian relations. While Miller provides great insight into the history of Irish-Israeli diplomatic relations, much of his analysis of the Israel-Palestine conflict tends to favor the Israeli perspective, failing to fully account for Palestinian beliefs and motivations.

John Doyle, director of the Institute for International Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction at Dublin City University, wrote a chapter focusing on Ireland's identification with Israel and Palestine titled "Irish Nationalism and the Israel-Palestinian Conflict" for *Ireland and the Middle East: Trade, Society and Peace*, edited by Rory Miller. Doyle approaches this from two angles: the Republic of Ireland's foreign policy and radical Irish nationalists' utilization of Palestine as a comparison in political discourse.⁸ Doyle asserts that "Irish foreign policy on Palestine is also a reflection of and consistent with support for other strong themes within modern Irish foreign policy—a concern with conflict resolution, strong support for the United Nations, for international law and for human rights."⁹ To Doyle, the Republic of Ireland's support for Palestine is largely based on the principles of justice and morality, whereas the more radical Northern Irish party Sinn Féin, often linked to the IRA, has tended to justify the militant nature of the IRA and PLO as part of an international anti-imperial movement.¹⁰

In *Civil Society, Post-Colonialism and Transnational Solidarity: The Irish and the Middle East Conflict*, Marie-Violaine Louvet examines Irish solidarity with the Palestinian cause through the lens of post-colonial theory. Louvet asserts that Ireland's identification with colonialism lends itself to "a sense of a shared history, however

⁶ Rory Miller, *Ireland and the Palestine Question: 1948-2004*, (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2005), 1.

⁷ Miller, *Ireland and the Palestine Question*, 1-2.

⁸ John Doyle, "Irish Nationalism and the Israel-Palestinian Conflict," in *Ireland and the Middle East: Trade, Society and Peace*, ed. Rory Miller (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007), 1.

⁹ Doyle, "Irish Nationalism," 4.

¹⁰ Doyle, "Irish Nationalism," 7.



IRA-PLO Mural in Northern Ireland, date unknown. [3]

constructed, between Ireland and Palestine.”¹¹ According to this theory, Irish civil society’s commitment to transnational solidarity is conditional on individuals’ perceptions of their history and how it relates to ongoing conflict in the Middle East.¹² Louvet observes that Irish and Palestinian similarities “are anchored in: resistance to a colonial force; the building of an identity in resistance against the prevailing system; the rejection of a territory’s partition; and the struggle against the inscription of discrimination in a legislative system based on the defence of human rights.”¹³ She also notes that the rise of Palestinian nationalism in the 1970s coincided with both the emergence of Ireland as an international player and the development of revisionist Irish histories. Louvet’s interpretation of Irish-Palestinian relations falls short, however, due to her disregard for the considerable impact the Lebanese Civil War had on Ireland’s perception of the Israel-Palestine conflict.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the evolution of Ireland’s relationship with Palestine from 1970 through the early 1980s in order to demonstrate how the relatively moderate government of the Republic of Ireland came to adopt a cause that was sponsored ini-

tially by the radical factions of Irish society. While Miller, Doyle, and Louvet present compelling arguments, each scholar uses a single framework to encapsulate the complex Irish-Palestinian relationship based on what each perceives to be ingrained Irish beliefs. Conversely, I aim to navigate the intricacies of this relationship by distinguishing between IRA and Irish civilians’ perceptions, illustrating the evolution of the Palestinians’ tactics to gain Irish support, and analyzing how factors such as Ireland’s role on the world stage, the 1967 Six Day War, the Troubles, the Lebanese Civil War, and Ireland’s colonial history each contributed to Ireland’s solidarity with Palestine. Furthermore, this paper illustrates diplomacy’s critical role, evidenced by the antagonism between Tel Aviv and Dublin and by the influence Ireland was able to have on European foreign policy. Several comparative studies between Ireland, Israel-Palestine, India, and South Africa have been undertaken by academics, but I do not seek to compare experiences of partition, apartheid, and oppression. Rather, these experiences are presented in order to emphasize the importance of Irish collective memory in shaping foreign policy.

¹¹ Marie-Violaine Louvet, *Civil Society, Post-Colonialism and Transnational Solidarity: The Irish and the Middle East Conflict*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016), 5.

¹² Louvet, *Civil Society*, 7-8.

¹³ Louvet, *Civil Society*, 9-10.

THE RISE OF THE PROVISIONAL IRA

THE PROVISIONAL IRA arose as a reactionary movement in the early days of the Troubles, following the violent suppression of an Irish Catholic-led civil rights campaign by local Protestants and British troops. The civil rights movement of the 1960s brought about a renewed commitment among Northern Irish Catholics to gain independence from Britain, but this was derailed by the militarization of Irish nationalists. Left-wing republicans believed a sustained protest campaign would eventually lead to the creation of a democratic socialist republic that encompassed the entire island of Ireland.¹⁴ Initial protests in the Northern Irish cities of Derry and Belfast were organized by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), which took cues from Martin Luther King Jr.'s policy of civil disobedience in the United States. For some, however, the demonstrations were "a way for republicans to expose the true character of the Northern Irish state [...] If the authorities responded with hostility and repression, nationalists would then be open to more radical ideas, and the IRA might once again come to the fore, this time with the popular support that had been lacking."¹⁵ The British attempt to violently suppress the civil rights movement enabled the rise of the Provisional IRA, which split from the Official IRA in 1969. Finn, in reference to Northern Ireland, states that "the Irish republican movement had two main components, an underground armed wing and a legal political party, formally separate although they were often led by the same people."¹⁶ The IRA training manual, commonly referred to as the "Green Book", proclaimed its violent tactics to be a morally justified crusade against

foreign occupation. Gaining public support from a historically conservative Catholic community required the IRA to engage in a defensive propaganda campaign, framing IRA members as vigilantes dedicated to liberating the Irish people.¹⁷

The legitimacy of the IRA's violent tactics was contentious among Northern Irish and those living in the Republic. In Northern Ireland, the IRA's political party Sinn Féin was supported by approximately a third Irish Catholic population in each election.¹⁸ Many Northern Irish viewed the IRA's armed struggle as a natural continuation of the Irish War of Independence, in which the Original IRA staged an insurrection to gain freedom from British rule.¹⁹ Moreover, in Northern Ireland, the Irish Catholic minority continued to experience discrimination from the British Protestant majority and repression at the hands of the British military. Irish Catholics suspected of supporting the IRA were subject to internment where prisoners were tortured through beatings, sleep deprivation, and waterboarding.²⁰ The frequent arrest of innocent civilians, often students and civil rights activists, radicalized the Northern Irish community, who felt obliged to protect their families and neighbors through any means necessary.

This is not to say, however, that Irish citizens in the Republic were not sympathetic to the cause. Hanley argues that "support for the IRA was often more widespread than many were prepared to admit and there were periods when aspects of the armed struggle could be tolerated [...] In late 1971 Irish military intelligence estimated that there were '20/40,000 active supporters' of the I.R.A. in the Republic."²¹ In the Republic, Irish civilians' toleration of insurgency violence oscillated based on the state of affairs in the North and whether the violence was preemptive or retributive. The early 1970s saw a rise in public sympathy as "incidents like Bloody Sunday and policies like internment without trial helped the PIRA win the popular support of the Catholic population in

14 Daniel Finn, *One Man's Terrorist: A Political History of the IRA*, (New York: Verso, 2019), 47.

15 Finn, *One Man's Terrorist*, 44. The IRA had unsuccessful campaigns in the 1950s and 1960s.

16 Finn, *One Man's Terrorist*, 3.

17 Irish Republican Army, *The Handbook for Volunteers of the Irish Republican Army: Notes on Guerilla Warfare* (Northern Ireland: 1977).

18 Finn, *One Man's Terrorist*, 2.

19 Brian Hanley, "'But then they started all this killing': Attitudes to the I.R.A. in the Irish Republic since 1969," *Irish Historical Studies* 38, no. 151 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 441.

20 Finn, *One Man's Terrorist*, 89-93; Andrew Hough, "Prisoners in Northern Ireland 'Subjected to Waterboarding by British Army Officers,'" *The Telegraph*, December 22, 2009.

21 Hanley, "Attitudes to the I.R.A.," 443, 456.

Northern Ireland, as well as the passive and active support of followers in the Republic of Ireland.”²² The Irish government in the Republic worked diligently to disassociate itself from the radical factions of Irish politics. Despite this, the success of the IRA relied on a certain degree of tacit consent from the civilian population, and these sympathizers frequently wrote letters to the *Irish Times* condemning imperialism, colonialism, Zionism, and the Israeli occupation of Palestine.

"ALLIANCE FOR VIOLENCE": THE NATURE OF THE IRA-PLO RELATIONSHIP

IN 1964, THE Palestine Liberation Organization was established to promote the Palestinian nationalist movement and to serve as an umbrella for numerous organizations and factions. Palestinian guerrillas, or fedayeen, are among those represented by the PLO. The fedayeen's rise in popularity in the 1970s grew out of Arab resentment from the 1967 Six Day War and coincided with the rise of the Provisional IRA. Within a few years, Fatah, the largest fedayeen organization, effectively controlled the PLO and therefore Palestinian politics. In a 1972 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report, American intelligence noted that “Fatah presents itself as an organization of strugglers who battle in the front lines for their ‘occupied homeland’ [...] [and] Fatah’s image as a moderate organization unencumbered by ideology was studiously promoted by its propaganda to permit Fatah to gain broad-based political acceptance.”²³ Much like the IRA, Fatah, the PLO,

and smaller fedayeen organizations worked to portray their actions as a necessary and righteous fight against their oppressors.

Initial contact between the two organizations was made as part of the international arms trade in the 1960s. Terrorist organizations across the globe developed an informal underground network to facilitate the black market weapons trade and recruit would-be militants for terrorist training camps. The PLO formed training centers in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, South Yemen, Algeria, and Libya, and IRA members were noted to have first attended training camps in Jordan in 1969.²⁴ In a report on international terrorism, the *New York Times* reported:

*In May 1972, IRA leaders sat in at the first international terrorist summit, organized by George Habash in Baddawi, Lebanon. And two months later, in Paris, Habash’s Palestinian Front and the armed bands of 12 other nationalities signed a formal ‘Declaration of Support’ for the Provisional IRA. Fifty Provos were selected for advanced guerilla training in Lebanon. Before long, there was a steady flow of IRA men to South Yemen for work with Wadi Haddad.*²⁵

The IRA-PLO relationship soon became mutually beneficial. The PLO was willing to smuggle imported Soviet weapons to the IRA, and in exchange, the IRA carried out terrorist operations in Europe as directed.²⁶ The bond between Irish republicans and Palestinian guerrillas was strengthened due to the pair’s common enemies and methods of resistance.

Both the PLO and the IRA were able to downplay some of the violence carried out by their organizations by framing their actions in terms of a greater, righteous fight for self determination, often invoking socialist and Marxist principles.²⁷ To gain sympathy and avoid being branded as terrorists, the IRA sought to promote its cause by portraying the Irish nationalist movement as part of a worldwide struggle against colonialism and imperialism. In the case of Fatah, the CIA argued that “the only philosophical basis required to establish

22 Christopher Paul et al., “Northern Ireland, 1969-1999,” in *Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2013), 327.

23 Central Intelligence Agency, “CA Propaganda Perspectives September 1972,” September 1, 1972, CREST, General CIA Records, Released August 5, 1998, 5.

24 Claire Sterling, “Terrorism: Tracing the International Network,” *New York Times*, March 1, 1981.

25 Sterling, “Terrorism.”

26 CIA, “CA Propaganda Perspectives,” 3.

27 Finn, *One Man’s Terrorist*, 5.

international connections is a common conviction in terrorism and violent revolution as the means to destroy the established order.”²⁸ By positioning these nationalist movements as a unified front against colonialism, the IRA and PLO gained sympathy from populations that suffered under oppressive foreign rulers and drew attention from foreign leaders seeking to destabilize Europe and the Middle East. The *New York Times* reported that by the end of 1971, “the I.R.A. was getting to be a focus of worldwide revolutionary interest second only to the Palestinian resistance.”²⁹ In efforts to undermine Western democracy, the Soviet Union and Libya bankrolled the IRA and PLO through direct funding and vast weapons shipments.³⁰ The utilization of socialist doctrine therefore granted the PLO and IRA legitimacy, created common enemies, and increased the scope of their future operations.

The PLO and the IRA developed a symbiotic relationship rooted in anti-imperialist ideology. Many Palestinians, having been driven out of their homeland following British occupation, perceived armed struggle to be the only viable option to reclaim their national identity and homeland.³¹ The British spearheaded the partitions of both Ireland and Palestine, and the IRA-PLO relationship found its footing on the legacy of separation. Britain’s failure to establish an independent Palestinian state and refusal to grant Northern Ireland independence created the conditions necessary for the empowerment of violent revolutionaries.

Israel-Palestine Through the Irish Postcolonial Lens—1967–1974:

Irish civilians, having experienced racial discrimination, religious intolerance, and oppression at the hands of the British, saw the Palestinian strug-

gle as analogous to their own. As Israel grew stronger after the Six Day War in 1967, sympathy for the Israelis, prevalent after the Holocaust, diminished among the Irish. Israel’s expansion led to a sharp influx of Palestinian refugees in neighboring countries, leading Irish citizens to see the Zionists as another colonizing force. In defense of Palestinian guerrillas one Irishman wrote a letter to the editor of the *Irish Times*, proclaiming:

*What help was world sympathy and popular support in repatriating the Palestinian refugees since 1948? [...] The artificially-created State of Zionist Israel was founded in essence on force, and it will not collapse under the weight of hostile international opinion but with military defeat [...] [The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine] opted for a military solution in place of a futile attempt to win over ‘the hearts and minds’ of the enlightened Zionists.*³²

Irish newspapers reporting on unrest in the Middle East often wrote from a pro-Arab stance, which helped steer the public to sympathize with the Palestinian cause. Western criticism of Israel was fueled by Irish citizens who wrote letters to Ireland’s leading newspaper, the *Irish Times*. The *Irish Times* served as a barometer of Irish society and politics in the latter half of the twentieth century, occupying “a unique position of influence in Irish society.”³³ In a letter to the editor published in 1972, the writer criticized the newspaper for “[trying] to justify Israeli aggression [...] in the face of an almost unanimous condemnation by the [UN] Security Council.”³⁴ As the 1970s progressed, Irish newspapers became increasingly and unapologetically critical of Israel, partially in response to complaints that the Western media was failing to report on atrocities committed

28 CIA, “CA Propaganda Perspectives,” 2.

29 Sterling, “Terrorism.”

30 “Weapons and Technology,” Inside the IRA, The IRA and Sinn Fein, Frontline; Sterling, “Terrorism.”

31 “The British Army in Palestine,” National Army Museum. After World War I Britain was granted the Mandate of Palestine and maintained control of the region for 30 years. In 1917 Britain had promised that a Jewish homeland would be created in Palestine, and when the Ottoman Empire fell, the British gained control of Palestine and oversaw the immigration of 100,000 Jews there. After World War II, the UN drew up a partition plan for Palestine, and the British withdrew. Israel declared independence in 1947, but the promise of an independent Arab state fell short.

32 Aonghus MacDonnell, “War in the Air,” *Irish Times*, Letters to the Editor, September 12, 1970.

33 Carole O’Reilly, “Review of The Irish Times: 150 Years of Influence,” *Reviews in History*.

34 Kevin J. O’Reilly, “Fighting Their Corners,” *Irish Times*, Letters to the Editor, July 6 1972.

by Israelis due to the perception of Israel as a Western foothold in the region.

Zionism as Neo-Colonialism: Irish Civil Society's Criticism of Israel, 1975–1979

Through the mid to late 1970s, Irish citizens continued to voice their opposition towards the Israeli government and often characterized Israel as a neocolonial state. Left-leaning Irish civilians decried Zionism, or Jewish nationalism, as a form of racism.³⁵ In an extensive opinion piece written in 1975, one Irish citizen wrote:

*If Zionism meant or implied the seizure of Palestine from its Arab inhabitants in order to establish there an exclusively or preponderantly Jewish State, then inescapably it stands convicted of racism [...] If on the other hand, this is not what Zionism meant, then the Jewish seizure of Palestine is revealed as a naked act of colonialist aggression.*³⁶

The term "Zionist" became highly politicized, and Israelis were often referred to as immigrant squatters.³⁷ The increasing popularity of right-wing politics in Israeli politics after the Six Day War further amplified criticism from left-leaning Irish citizens. Israel's aggressive expansionism and creation of settlements in occupied territories, in direct violation of international law, corroborated Irish citizens' accusations that Zionism was merely a front for settler colonialism.³⁸

The Irish-Arab Society

In 1969, the Irish-Arab Society was formed in Dublin to promote trade between Ireland and the Arab world. The Society utilized its platform to push a political agenda that included the

creation of an independent Palestinian state.³⁹ The Society's founding members were postgraduate doctors, and they advocated for Palestinians from a more nuanced perspective than the IRA. There was some overlap, however, between the Irish-Arab Society and the IRA, as "the main force behind [the Irish-Arab Society's] foundation was Sean Ryan, a Dublin businessman who had earlier been interned [...] [under the] Special Powers Act during the IRA campaign in the 1950s."⁴⁰ Sean Ryan's past associations therefore undercut the Society's success, due to suspicions that it was functioning as an intermediary between the IRA, Libya, and terrorist organizations.⁴¹

The Irish-Arab Society did, however, play a role in shaping public debate on Palestine through published letters to the editor in the *Irish Times*. In the Society's magazine, the *Irish-Arab News*, the founders argued that "Israeli propaganda presented a one-sided picture of the Arab-Israeli struggle that was uncritically accepted by the Irish people as a whole, and in the mass media remarkably little interest in, or sympathy with, the Arabs were shown, and this had to be changed."⁴² In reality, through the 1960s the Irish public was sympathetic to both the Israelis and the Arabs, and Irish newspapers attempted to balance the two perspectives. The aggression displayed by Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War compelled the Irish to be concerned for the Palestinians, and this newfound sympathy was likely seen as an opportunity by the Irish-Arab Society's founders to foster relations between Ireland and the Arab world. The Society helped shift Irish public opinion to become more critical of Israel and ensure that the Palestinian issue remained at the forefront of Ireland's foreign policy concerns.

35 David J Smyth, "UN Voting," *Irish Times*, Letters to the Editor, July 9, 1979.

36 Atif Atouk, "Zionism Merely a Cover for Israeli Imperialism," *Irish Times*, Opinion, December 30, 1975.

37 John Tozer, "Arab Rights," *Irish Times*, Letters to the Editor, July 12, 1975.

38 "Israel Refuses to Halt Settlements in Occupied Areas," *Irish Times*, February 27, 1978.

39 Marie-Violaine Louvet, "Shedding Light on the Arab World: the Irish-Arab News, 1975-85," *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 23, no. 1 (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2012), 191.

40 Louvet, "Irish Arab News," 200.

41 Louvet, "Irish Arab News," 201.

42 Louvet, "Irish Arab News," 197.

ACTIVE NEUTRALITY: IRELAND'S ROLE ON THE INTER- NATIONAL STAGE

AS A COUNTRY that experienced rather than imposed colonialism, in geopolitics Ireland was often trusted as a neutral force to help stabilize and restore sovereignty to war-torn regions. After gaining independence from Britain in the early twentieth century, Ireland maintained a policy of neutrality in foreign affairs through the 1950s. In 1955, Ireland was granted admission to the UN and began defining its political role on the international stage through “participation in peacekeeping missions and service on the [UN] Security Council at times of great international tension.”⁴³ In the period of decolonization after World War II, European countries withdrew from the Middle East, but the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli conflict destabilized the region. Many European countries were hesitant to intervene, but the UN began a series of peacekeeping missions. In 1958, Ireland contributed fifty soldiers to the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon, initiating a nontraditional approach to interventionism based on humanitarianism.⁴⁴ This policy of “Active Neutrality [envisioned] a non-aligned Ireland acting as a bridge between the developed and developing world.”⁴⁵ Ireland further distinguish-

shed itself from other Western UN member states in 1960 through strong support for the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.⁴⁶ Ireland’s national identity was significantly influenced and shaped by the Irish people’s experiences under British rule; thus the country sought to defend the right of self-determination for weaker states.⁴⁷

Hostility between Israel and the Arab world escalated following the 1967 Six Day War between Israel and allied Jordan, Egypt, and Syria. The aggression that Israel displayed tarnished the country’s image. Israel’s unexpected victory led to the occupation of the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem and displaced nearly 400,000 Palestinians.⁴⁸ European sympathy for the Palestinians arose out of this refugee crisis, as many Palestinians “had sought refuge in the West Bank and Gaza after having to abandon their homes in 1948–49.”⁴⁹ The Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) treatment of Palestinians sparked outrage, and between 1967 and 1971, the UN estimated that the Israelis had destroyed over 16,000 Palestinian Arab homes in the territories seized during the Six Day War in addition to “35 villages in the occupied Golan Heights that were razed to the ground.”⁵⁰ International perception of Israel shifted drastically during this time, as the seemingly vulnerable state became the aggressor.

Western Europe began to take more decisive stances on the ongoing conflict in the Middle East following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.⁵¹ In 1973, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Denmark joined the European Economic Community (EEC), a multinational organization established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The organization was founded by

43 "One Hundred Years of Irish Foreign Policy," Royal Irish Academy, last modified October 15, 2019.

44 Óglaigh na hÉireann, *Irish Defense Forces*, "Middle East Past Missions," Overseas Deployments.

45 "Ireland - Foreign Relations," Global Security. Ireland's "triple lock" policy requires UN authorization and approval from the Irish government and parliament before Irish soldiers can be deployed overseas.

46 Noel Dorr, "Ireland at the United Nations: 40 Years On," *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 7, no. 1 (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 1996), 46.

47 Dorr, "Ireland at the United Nations," 41.

48 Jeremy Bowen, "1967 War: Six Days that Changed the Middle East," *BBC*, June 4, 2017.

49 Berry and Greg Philo, *Israel and Palestine: Competing Histories*, (London: Pluto Press, 2006), 48-49.

50 Berry and Philo, *Israel and Palestine*, 49.

51 The 1973 Arab-Israeli War is commonly referred to as the Yom Kippur War, the Ramadan War, and the October War, as the war began on Jewish holiday Yom Kippur in October 1973. Ramadan, Islam’s holy month of fasting and prayer, also occurred in October of 1973. The war will be referred to as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War in order to avoid suggesting a pro-Israeli/pro-Arab stance and to mitigate any confusion.



Free Palestine Murals in Belfast. [4]

France, Italy, Belgium, West Germany, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in order to promote economic cooperation and establish a common market in western Europe.⁵² The EEC was “directly affected by the consequences of the [1973 Arab-Israeli War] [...] In order to force the Western countries to put pressure on Israel [...] the Arab oil-producing countries cut exports to Europe and America.”⁵³ After a ceasefire was declared, the EEC realized that a comprehensive solution to restore peace in the Middle East would be necessary. The EEC called for Israel to return the occupied territories forcefully acquired in the 1967 war and recognized that “in the establishment of a just and lasting peace account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.”⁵⁴ The ambiguity of the statement concerning Palestinian rights ultimately was a reflection of the EEC’s various and often conflicting geopolitical interests.

IRELAND AT THE UN: GIVING THE PLO A SEAT AT THE TABLE

IN THE MID-1970s, Ireland was not yet ready to officially endorse Palestinian statehood, but the Irish government believed the Palestinians should have the opportunity to observe UN proceedings. At the same time, Yasser Arafat, founding member of Fatah and Chairman of the PLO, embarked on a new approach to gain Palestinian statehood by appealing directly to countries deemed sympathetic to the cause. When Ireland joined the EEC in 1973, Irish politicians began using this platform to advocate for pro-Palestinian policies. Member states of

⁵² "The History of the European Union," About the EU, European Union, last modified July 28, 2020. Since 1993, the EEC has been incorporated into the EU. The EEC is generally considered to be the predecessor of the EU. Despite its name, the EEC exercised control over political matters as well.

⁵³ "The EEC as a Major Player in International Relations," 1969-1979 Completion, Deepening and Widening, Historical Events in the European Integration Process (1945-2014); "Relations with the Middle East and the Oil Crises," 1969-1979 Completion, Deepening and Widening, Historical Events in the European Integration Process (1945-2014).

⁵⁴ "Declaration of the Nine Foreign Ministers of 6 November 1973, in Brussels, on the Situation in the Middle East," Joint Statement by the Governments of the EEC (6 November 1973).

the EEC were beginning to believe that “a solution to the wider Arab-Israeli conflict necessitated a resolution of the Palestine problem.”⁵⁵ In particular, Ireland, Italy, and France adopted positions in favor of the Palestinians, but each country’s purpose for doing so differed. Jacob Abadi states that “Italy’s proximity to the Arab world and its vulnerability not only to the Arab boycott but also to Palestinian terrorism” encouraged Italy to vote in favor of the Palestinian cause, and this policy also helped to appease left-wing members of its Parliament who sought to foster positive relations with Arab nations.⁵⁶ Similarly, France’s Palestinian support was fueled by self-interest, as France “perceived the advocacy of [...] Palestinian rights to be the best means of supporting French interests, which included the protection of access to Middle East oil, arms sales to the region, regional security through a just peace settlement, and the maintenance of French political influence and independence.”⁵⁷ Ireland distinguished itself by approaching foreign policy from a moral perspective which encouraged impartiality.

In 1974 Arab states voted unanimously to recognize the PLO as the official representative of the Palestinians.⁵⁸ The same month, the United Nations voted in favor of allowing the PLO to participate in the Assembly as an observer. Ireland, Italy, and France voted in favor of this resolution, sparking outrage among Israeli leaders.⁵⁹ The Irish government maintained its support, asserting that they held “a ‘nuanced’ view [...] [The government] does not approve of the terrorism of the PLO, but [believes] the PLO is capable of being ‘nudged’ into right directions and nothing is gained by pretending the PLO does not exist.”⁶⁰ In other words, Ireland hoped by providing support and allowing Palestinian voices to be heard that the PLO in turn would become more moderate, and the Irish government suspected that ignoring the PLO would lead to further radicalization. The ongoing conflict in Northern Ireland likely influenced this approach. Throughout the Troubles, British

attempts to censor and eradicate the IRA often resulted in a surge in the IRA’s membership and deadly retaliation. The Irish government sought to foster a sense of understanding of the PLO’s motives from its own experience and avoid instigating violence.

CAMP SHAMROCK: IRISH EXPERIENCES IN LEBANON

IN THE LATE 1970s, Ireland’s intercession on behalf of the Palestinians escalated from rhetorical to a fixed commitment as the Irish Defense Forces agreed to be a part of the UN’s intervention in Lebanon. The outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975 made evident the ramifications of the failure to resolve the Palestinian issue. Many displaced Palestinians lived in South Lebanon near the Israeli border, and the PLO based many of their operations there. PLO raids into Israel destabilized Lebanon, leading to internal power struggles as seen in a series of violent confrontations between Lebanese Christians and Palestinian Muslims. A ceasefire was brokered by Syria, and Arab states agreed to place peacekeeping troops in Lebanon. Lebanon was divided: West Beirut and southern Lebanon were controlled by the PLO, and East Beirut and northern Lebanon were controlled by Christian militia groups and Syria. The PLO resumed its attacks from the Lebanese border into Israel, and Israel retaliated by invading Lebanon in March 1978. The UN quickly intervened, creating the United Nations

55 Miller, *Ireland and the Palestine Question*, 74.

56 Jacob Abadi, "Constraints and Adjustments in Italy's Policy toward Israel," *Middle Eastern Studies* 38, no. 4 (Oxfordshire, UK: Taylor & Francis, 2002), 64.

57 Pia Christina Wood, "France and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Mitterand Policies, 1981-1992," *Middle East Journal* 47, no. 1 (Washington D.C.: The Middle East Journal, 1993), 21.

58 Henry Tanners, "Arab Leaders Issue Call for a Palestinian State; Arafat Given Main Role," *New York Times*, October 29, 1974.

59 Miller, *Ireland and the Palestine Question*, 79.

60 American Embassy Dublin, Ireland. Telegram to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, U.S. Department of State, American Embassies Algeria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Northern Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and Yemen. "Euro-Arab Meeting in Dublin," September 16, 1976, WikiLeaks.



Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization giving a speech at the UN General Assembly in 1974. [5]

Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to ensure Israel's withdrawal and reinforce the Lebanese government's authority within its own borders.⁶¹

Ireland contributed members of the Irish Army to UNIFIL, continuing the Irish Army's tradition of serving in peacekeeping missions. UNIFIL peacekeepers were intended to serve as a buffer between Palestinians and Israelis, oversee the withdrawal of IDF forces from southern Lebanon, and restore Lebanese sovereignty.⁶²

The successful execution of the UN mission was thwarted, however, due to "the arrogant assumption that the UN was so august a body that no one—least of all the militias of Lebanon or their regional superpower allies—would dare contradict it."⁶³ This fallacy became apparent as Christian militiamen formed a security belt along a strip of land in southern Lebanon reaching the Israeli border, in accordance with IDF orders. This enabled the Israelis to occupy southern Lebanon under the guise of the militias. UNIFIL attempted to reinstate order by setting up its base of operations in Naqoura but found itself surrounded and outnumbered.⁶⁴ The uneasy relationship between Israel and Ireland worsened as "Irish soldiers [faced] the daily arrogance of the Israeli Army, and [grew close] with the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples." Irish Senator Mick Lannigan asserted that "it was the experiences of thousands of ordinary Irish soldiers in Lebanon that lay at the root of the widespread Irish popular sympathy for the Palestinians."⁶⁵ As Irish UN peacekeepers were routinely targeted and killed by Christian militiamen, resentment proliferated back in Ireland.

In April 1980, a series of hostage crises in the Irish UNIFIL sector in At Tiri further impaired the tenuous relationship between Ireland and Israel. Israeli-backed militias accused the Irish of allowing the PLO to set up bases within the sector, and militiamen and Irish soldiers had several violent clashes. In a two-week period, Christian militiamen took a total of fifteen Irish soldiers hostage. On April 18, Privates John O'Mahony, Thomas Barrett, and Derek Smallhorne were taken by militia forces. O'Mahony was shot and abandoned while Barrett and Smallhorne were first held hostage and killed later that day.⁶⁶ Shlomo Argov, the Israeli ambassador to Britain and Ireland, fueled feelings of hostility during an interview on a Dublin radio station when instead of condemning the men responsible for the deaths of Irish UN peacekeepers, Argov "lectured the Irish on their Christian duties in Lebanon."⁶⁷ At the funeral of Private Stephen Griffin, "Irish officers among the mourners spoke angrily of Israel's 'com-

61 "UNIFIL Fact Sheet," Current Operations, United Nations Peacekeeping.

62 United Nations, *U.N. Security Council Resolution 425*, March 19, 1978.

63 Robert Fisk, *Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 135.

64 Fisk, *Pity the Nation*, 136-138. Naqoura is a city in southern Lebanon near the Israeli border and within the security belt formed by Christian militiamen and Israelis.

65 Philip O'Connor, "Palestine in Irish Politics, A History: The Irish State and the 'Question of Palestine' 1918-2011," Sadaka Paper no. 8, The Ireland Palestine Alliance, July 2011, 16.

66 Miller, *Ireland and the Palestine Question*, 98-99.

67 Fisk, *Pity the Nation*, 152.; Olivia O'Leary, "Hostility Grows as Israeli Envoy Attacks Ireland," *Irish Times*,

SEEKING STATEHOOD: YASSER ARAFAT'S PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN

plicity' in the killings."⁶⁸ Perception of the Irish battalion's role in Lebanon also influenced Irish foreign policy on the wider Arab-Israeli conflict. Miller attests that the hostage crises in April 1980 swiftly crippled Irish-Israeli relations, marking "the beginning of two decades during which time tensions over Israeli actions in Lebanon would have a major influence on Irish political and diplomatic attitudes towards the Palestine question."⁶⁹ Ireland released a Cabinet statement following the Irish soldiers' deaths wherein the government emphasized Ireland's critical role in UN missions to promote peace and, in reference to Israel, condemned the calculated attacks on Irish troops by militia groups "supplied, trained, advised, and supported from outside by a United Nations member state."⁷⁰ The Irish were enraged, as they viewed their role in UNIFIL as vital for regional peace and stability, and the Irish battalion had a reputation as the most tolerant and even-tempered of the UN's troops.⁷¹ Despite this, Irish peacekeepers had the highest number of fatalities out of all countries that served in UNIFIL, and Ireland held Israel responsible for approximately a third of these deaths.⁷²

Irish and Israeli newspapers sharply criticized one another routinely, and Irish public opinion of Israel became increasingly negative as the Israelis failed to display sympathy for Irish casualties. Fisk argues that following Irish foreign minister Brian Lennihan's recognition of the PLO in February 1980, "the Irish [were] singled out for vilification by the Israelis. Journalists working out of Jerusalem were treated to long and supposedly humorous discourses on the whiskey-drinking Irish, or the 'Johnny Walker Irish' as the Israelis and their militia allies dubbed the UN battalion."⁷³ Furthermore, Israeli newspapers accused the Irish battalion of being partisan and demonizing the Israelis and their allies. In May 1980, an article in the *Jerusalem Post* declared: "the pro-Palestinian bias of ordinary soldiers in Ireland's UN force has been no secret," and accused Irish Catholics of supporting the internationalization of Jerusalem to appease the Vatican.⁷⁴

AS IRELAND BEGAN adopting more concrete pro-Palestinian policies, Arafat worked to distance himself and the PLO from their previous associations with the IRA. In January 1980, Arafat pledged that the PLO would no longer be involved with the IRA, as doing so would jeopardize diplomatic relations with Ireland.⁷⁵ This suggests that the PLO was willing to concede previous harsh stances in an attempt to gain legitimacy as a political body among the international community. Whether or not Arafat's pledge was genuine has been debated. As the leader of the PLO, Arafat was associated with several terrorist groups in earlier years. However, this change in approach, from cutting ties to terrorist networks to working through official diplomatic channels, indicates that Arafat knew that in order to gain the support he needed, the PLO must at least appear to be above board. In 1980, at a joint conference for the Palestine National Council and the Parliamentary Association for Euro-Arab Cooperation, the PLO reemphasized their abandonment of the IRA cause, stating that "the Palestinians would not cease their armed struggle to achieve the creation of a Palestinian state, 'but in the process of campaigning for the backing of European governments and establishing respectability, they have dropped all support [...] for the provisional IRA and all such groups.'"⁷⁶ The PLO imple-

April 21, 1980.

68 Fisk, *Pity the Nation*, 153.

69 Miller, *Ireland and the Palestine Question*, 97.

70 Government of Ireland to United Nations Secretary-General, April 20, 1980.

71 Robert Fisk, "Irish Open Fire after Gun Attack," *Irish Times*, April 12, 1980.

72 "United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon," Wikipedia; O'Connor, "Palestine in Irish Politics," 16.

73 Fisk, *Pity the Nation*, 154.

74 Fisk, *Pity the Nation*, 153-154.

75 Charles Devereaux, "PLO Pledge on IRA Accepted," *Irish Times*, January 14, 1980.

76 Louvet, "Irish Arab News," 202.



Respects paid to UNIFIL Irish Peacekeepers who lost their lives in the 1980s, April 2021. [6]

mented this strategy in order to gain credibility, hoping that Palestinian insurgents would be seen as freedom fighters rather than terrorists.

for an independent Palestinian state.⁷⁸ In an interview following the release of this statement, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin “[declared] the Declaration ‘a hostile act’ by Ireland against Israel and tantamount to acceptance of the PLO’s ‘right to destroy the Jewish state.’”⁷⁹ However, rather than appeasing the Israelis, the Irish government doubled down on its support for the Palestinian state by working to gain the support of the EEC. Louvet asserts:

BAHRAIN AND VENICE

IRELAND STRONGLY believed that the Palestinian people had a fundamental right to establish an independent state and argued that diplomatic recognition of the PLO was in accordance with the Palestinians’ right to choose their own representative.⁷⁷ A few weeks after Arafat pledged that the PLO would dissolve its links to the IRA, Irish Foreign Minister Brian Lenihan issued a joint statement, commonly known as the Bahrain Declaration, alongside Bahraini Foreign Minister Shaikh Muhammad Bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa recognizing the PLO as the official representatives of the Palestinian people and calling

With [the Bahrain Declaration] acknowledging the rights of Palestinians to self-determination, Ireland was a precursor in the European Economic Community, as this statement was made a few months before the Venice declaration (June 1980) was issued by the nine member states of the European Community, making much the same commitment.⁸⁰

The Venice Declaration upheld the same principles as the Bahrain Declaration, marking a transition in the EEC’s position on Palestine. Rather than treating the Palestinian issue as simply a refugee crisis, the EEC recognized that a comprehensive peace agreement

⁷⁷ "Haughey Claims Good RTE Relations," *Irish Times*, February 27, 1980.

⁷⁸ Irish Foreign Minister Brian Lenihan and Bahraini Foreign Minister Shaikh Muhammad Bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa, "The Bahrain Declaration," February 10, 1980, Manama, Bahrain.

⁷⁹ O'Connor, "Palestine in Irish Politics," 16.

⁸⁰ Louvet, *Civil Society*, 3.

between both sides would be necessary. The Venice Declaration certified the Palestinians' right to self-determination and acknowledged the PLO as the legitimate representative body for the Palestinian people.⁸¹

CONCLUSION

IRELAND'S SUPPORT OF Palestine has been characterized by some scholars as part of a broader Irish tendency to interpret current events around the world within Irish historical context. However, a myriad of external factors led up to Ireland's call for Palestinian self-determination, including: the influence of the IRA, Irish civilian pro-Palestinian campaigns, the deterioration of Irish-Israeli relations, and the PLO's commitment to severing ties with terrorist groups.

Ireland's initial support for Palestine was a consequence of the rise of the Provisional IRA during the Troubles. The IRA's alliance with the PLO aided in directing Irish citizens' attention to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Many Irish citizens rejected the violent tactics of the IRA but sympathized with the reasoning behind the insurgency, and the motivations of the PLO were seen in a similar light. The goodwill fostered between Irish soldiers and the Palestinians in the mid-to-late 1970s during the Lebanese Civil War prompted the PLO to begin to rescind its ties to the IRA in favor of the Irish government, in hopes of gaining legitimacy.

International attention was drawn to the Irish peacekeepers' role in Lebanon, enabling Ireland to ascend as an influential diplomatic power. Irish peacekeepers had been stationed in the Middle East since 1958, but it was not until after the 1967 Six Day War that Irish sympathies shifted to support Palestine more earnestly. At this time, the government of Ireland began vocalizing support for Palestinians from a humanitarian perspective, and the war provoked Irish journalists to write from increasingly pro-Arab stances which placed further pressure on the Irish government. Irish diplomats were cautious,

however, not to needlessly antagonize Israel and sought to advocate for Palestinian rights while maintaining Ireland's political and economic responsibilities as a member of the EEC and the UN.⁸²

As the 1970s progressed, the war in Lebanon, notably the hostage crises in 1980, stripped Ireland of its sympathy towards Israel. When Ireland began developing formal diplomatic relations with the PLO, Israeli politicians denounced the Irish for "lending support 'to an organisation of murderers.'"⁸³ Further verbal attacks paired with the hostile, sometimes deadly, treatment of Irish peacekeepers in Lebanon brought about an antagonistic relationship between the Irish and the Israelis. The Irish perception of Israel transformed from passive criticism to blatant antipathy, coinciding with a rise in Irish solidarity with the Palestinians.

By the early 1980s, despite ongoing domestic turmoil, Ireland had transformed from a previously neutral small state to what would later be called "an unlikely diplomatic superpower," due to its tendency "to punch above its own weight on the international stage."⁸⁴ Ireland advantageously used its position within the EEC to steer European foreign relations in favor of supporting Palestine, and Ireland's stance on this issue certainly enabled Ireland to develop strong ties with the Arab world. Ireland's deep sympathy with Palestine has been in part influenced by Irish postcolonialism. However, Ireland's promotion of international cooperation required a recognition of the rule of law by all parties. The Irish government was not willing to condone terrorism; thus, Ireland did not recognize Palestine until the PLO renounced ties with the IRA and other notable violent associations. Irish foreign policy continues to display distinct moral considerations, drawing from Irish experiences of violence and oppression under British rule and throughout the Troubles. In Palestine as elsewhere, Ireland's foreign policy remains defined by its use of soft power that reflects a desire to advocate on behalf of oppressed populations and support for international cooperation as a means of achieving peace. ♦

81 European Council, "Venice Declaration," June 13, 1980, Venice, Italy.

82 Miller, *Ireland and the Palestine Question*, 68, 74, 85.

83 O'Connor, "Palestine in Irish Politics," 15.

84 Shane O'Brien, "'Ireland has become an Unlikely Diplomatic Superpower,' says The Economist," *Irish Central*, July 20, 2020.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abadi, Jacob. "Constraints and Adjustments in Italy's Policy toward Israel." *Middle Eastern Studies* 38, no. 4 (2002): 63-94. JSTOR.
- Atouk, Atif. "Zionism Merely a Cover for Israeli Imperialism." Opinion. *Irish Times*, December 30, 1975. <https://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/archive/1975/1230/Pg009.html#Ar00901>.
- Barclary-Russell, Kathleen. "Israel's New Frontiers." Letters to the Editor. *Irish Times*, April 12, 1971. <http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/archive/1971/0412/Pg016.html#Ar01607>.
- "Beechmount/Falls Corner." Extramural Activity. <https://extramuralactivity.com/beechnmount-falls-corner/>.
- Berry, Mike, and Greg Philo. *Israel and Palestine: Competing Histories*. London: Pluto Press, 2006. JSTOR.
- Bowen, Jeremy. "1967 War: Six Days that Changed the Middle East." BBC, June 4, 2017. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39960461>.
- "The British Army in Palestine," National Army Museum. <https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/conflict-Palestine>.
- "Declaration of the Nine Foreign Ministers of 6 November 1973, in Brussels, on the Situation in the Middle East." CVCE. https://www.cvce.eu/obj/joint_statement_by_the_governments_of_the_eec_6_november_1973-en-a08b36bc-6d29-475c-aadb-0f71c59dbc3e.html.
- Devereaux, Charles. "PLO Pledge on IRA Accepted." *Irish Times*, January 14, 1980. <https://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/archive/1980/0114/Pg005.html#Ar00503>.
- Devine, Danny. "Growing up in Belfast: 'I Saw British Soldiers Holding Guns Every Day, so I Must Have Copied Them'." *The Guardian*, December 1, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2017/dec/01/growing-up-in-belfast-british-soldiers-holding-guns-thats-me-in-the-picture>.
- Dorr, Noel. "Ireland at the United Nations: 40 Years On." *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 7 (1996): 41-62. JSTOR.
- Doyle, John. "Irish Nationalism and the Israel-Palestinian Conflict." *In Ireland and the Middle East: Trade, Society and Peace*, edited by Rory Miller, 87-100. Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007.
- "The EEC as a Major Player in International Relations." CVCE. https://www.cvce.eu/obj/the_eec_as_a_major_player_in_international_relations-en-a2d69dcf-de1d-4bbf-b6c4-cae7f79ea086.html.
- European Council. "Venice Declaration." June 13, 1980. Venice, Italy. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/mepp/docs/venice_declaration_1980_en.pdf.
- Finn, Daniel. *One Man's Terrorist: A Political History of the IRA*. New York: Verso, 2019.
- Fisk, Robert. "Irish Open Fire after Gun Attack." *Irish Times*, April 12, 1980. <https://irishtimes.com/newspaper/archive/1980/0412/Pg006.html#Ar00609>.
- Fisk, Robert. *Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Hanley, Brian. "'But then they started all this killing': Attitudes to the I.R.A. in the Irish Republic since 1969." *Irish Historical Studies* 38, no. 151 (2013): 439-456. JSTOR.
- "Haughey Claims Good RTE Relations." *Irish Times*, February 27, 1980. <https://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/archive/1980/0227/Pg005.html#Ar00501>.
- "The History of the European Union." About the EU, European Union. Last modified July 28, 2020. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en.
- Hough, Andrew. "Prisoners in Northern Ireland 'Subjected to Waterboarding by British Army Officers.'" *The Telegraph*, December 22, 2009. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/northernireland/6862034/Prisoners-in-Northern-Ireland-subjected-to-waterboarding-by-British-army-officers.html>.
- "Ireland - Foreign Relations." Global Security. <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/ie-forrel.htm>.
- Irish Foreign Minister Brian Lenihan and Bahraini Foreign Minister Shaikh Muhammad Bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa. "The Bahrain Declaration." February 10, 1980. Manama, Bahrain. http://www.sadaka.ie/Articles/OtherReports/OTHER-Bahrain_Declaration.pdf.
- Irish Republican Army. *The Handbook for Volunteers of the Irish Republican Army: Notes on Guerilla Warfare*. Northern Ireland: 1977. https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/othelem/organ/ira/ira_green_book.

- html.
- “Israel Refuses to Halt Settlements in Occupied Areas.” *Irish Times*, February 27, 1978. <https://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/archive/1978/0227/Pg006.html#Ar00605>.
- John Tozer, “Arab Rights.” Letters to the Editor. *Irish Times*, July 12, 1975, <https://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/archive/1975/0712/Pg011.html#Ar01109>.
- Kissinger, Henry, Telegram to American Embassy Dublin, American Consulate Belfast, and American Embassy London, Sep. 10, 1979, WikiLeaks.
- Louvet, Marie-Violaine. *Civil Society, Post-Colonialism and Transnational Solidarity: The Irish and the Middle East Conflict*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016.
- Louvet, Marie-Violaine. “Shedding Light on the Arab World: The ‘Irish-Arab News’, 1975-85.” *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 23 (2012): 191–203. JSTOR.
- MacDonnell, Aonghus. “War in the Air.” Letters to the Editor. *Irish Times*, September 12, 1970. <http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/archive/1970/0912/Pg009.html#Ar00900>.
- Miller, Rory. *Ireland and the Palestine Question: 1948-2004*. Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2005.
- Nelson, Erik David, “Memory, Narrative, and Identity Shifts in Modern Ireland” (2016). *Undergraduate Honors Theses*. William & Mary. Paper 883. <https://scholarworks.wm.edu/honorstheses/883>.
- O’Brien, Shane. “‘Ireland has become an Unlikely Diplomatic Superpower,’ says The Economist.” *Irish Central*, July 20, 2020. <https://www.irishcentral.com/news/politics/ireland-unlikely-diplomatic-superpower>.
- O’Connor, Phillip. “Palestine in Irish Politics, A History: The Irish State and the ‘Question of Palestine’ 1918-2011.” Dublin: Sadaka — The Ireland Palestine Alliance, 2011. http://www.sadaka.ie/Articles/Papers/PAPER-Palestine_in_Irish_Politics.pdf.
- O’Leary, Olivia. “Hostility Grows as Israeli Envoy Attacks Ireland.” *Irish Times*, April 21, 1980. <https://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/archive/1980/0421/Pg001.html#Ar00100>.
- “One Hundred Years of Irish Foreign Policy.” *Royal Irish Academy*. Last modified October 15, 2019. <https://www.ria.ie/news/documents-irish-foreign-policy/one-hundred-years-irish-foreign-policy>.
- O’Reilly, Carole. “Review of The Irish Times: 150 Years of Influence.” *Reviews in History*. <https://reviews.history.ac.uk/review/1804>.
- O’Reilly, Kevin J. “Fighting Their Corners.” Letters to the Editor. *Irish Times*, July 6 1972. <http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/archive/1972/0706/Pg012.html#Ar01200>.
- Óglaigh na hÉireann, Irish Defense Forces. “Middle East Past Missions.” Overseas Deployments. <https://www.military.ie/en/overseas-deployments/past-missions/middle-east-missions/>.
- Paul, Christopher, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan. “Northern Ireland, 1969-1999.” *In Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies*, 318-330. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2013. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR291z2.html.
- PBS. “Weapons and Technology.” Inside the IRA, The IRA and Sinn Fein. <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/inside/weapons.html>.
- “Relations with the Middle East and the Oil Crises.” CVCE. <https://www.cvce.eu/en/collections/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/548d2b44-a4f0-460e-a26d-999028832012>.
- Rolston, Bill. “‘The Brothers on the Walls’: International Solidarity and Irish Political Murals.” *Journal of Black Studies* 39, no. 3 (2009): 446–70. JSTOR.
- Security Council Resolution 425, S/RES/425 (19 March 1978), available from [https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/425\(1978\)](https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/425(1978)).
- Security Council Resolution 426, S/RES/426 (19 March 1978), available from [https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/426\(1978\)](https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/426(1978)).
- Smyth, David J. “UN Voting.” Letters to the Editor. *Irish Times*, July 9, 1979. <https://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/archive/1979/0709/Pg009.html#Ar00900>.
- Sterling, Claire. “Terrorism: Tracing the International Network.” *New York Times*, March 1, 1981. <https://www.nytimes.com/1981/03/01/magazine/terrorism-tracing-the-international-network.html>.
- Tanners, Henry. “Arab Leaders Issue Call for a Palestinian State; Arafat Given Main Role.” *New York Times*, October 29, 1974. ProQuest.

- “UNIFIL Fact Sheet.” United Nations Peacekeeping. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unifil>.
- “United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.” Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Interim_Force_in_Lebanon#cite_note-A-54.
- United Nations, Security Council, *Letter dated 21 April 1980 from the Acting Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General*, S/13901 (20 April 1980), available from undocs.org/en/S/13901.
- Viggiani, Elisabetta. *Talking Stones: The Politics of Memorialization in Post-Conflict Northern Ireland*. 1st ed. Berghahn Books, 2014. JSTOR.
- Wood, Pia Christina. “France and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Mitterrand Policies, 1981-1992.” *Middle East Journal* 47, no. 1 (1993): 21-40. JSTOR.
- [6] “RESPECTS PAID TO 5 UNIFIL IRISH-PEACEKEEPERS FALLEN IN THE LINE OF DUTY,” UN Photos/ Corporal Lee Coyle, April 21, 2021. <https://unifil.unmissions.org/respects-paid-5-unifil-irish-peacekeepers-fallen-line-duty>.

Image Sources

- [1] Peter Muhly, A protest led by the Ireland-Palestine Solidarity Campaign (IPSC), The New Republic, May 20, 2014. <https://newrepublic.com/article/117839/irish-support-palestine-opposition-israel-rise>.
- [2] Keith Ruffles. “Palestinian Solidarity Mural,” October 6, 2013. <https://web.archive.org/web/20161028210749/http://www.panoramio.com/photo/97479756>.
- [3] “Arafat-Sharon Mural,” The Palestine Poster Project Archives, 2002. <https://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/arafat-sharon-mural>.
- [4] Ian M. Butterfield, “Palestine Murals in Belfast,” Alamy Stock Photo. <https://www.alamy.com/stock-photo-palestine-murals-in-belfast-13188786.html>.
- [5] AP, “UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ARAFAT,” November 14, 1974. <https://www.shutterstock.com/editorial/image-editorial/un-general-assembly-arafat-united-nations-7382160a>.