

“AMERICA SHOULD TAKE HER SHARE”

Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service & U.S. Imperial Ambitions, 1915-1929



First class in the Foreign Service School, with Edmund A. Walsh, S.J., pictured to the right, 1919, Georgetown University Library, Special Collections Gallery

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Written for **HIST 409: Senior Seminar History Honors**

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PROLOGUE

IN *SILENCING THE Past: Power and the Production of History*, Michel-Rolph Trouillot uses the metaphor of a gun silencer as a meditation on how history “works” rather than what history “is.”¹ The historian, in choosing to privilege and reproduce some narratives about the past over others, inevitably writes history as an active, constructed, and selective process: “one ‘silences’ a fact or an individual as a silencer silences a gun.”² This understanding of history is at the heart of “America Should Take Her Share: Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and U.S. Imperial Ambitions, 1915–1929.” This narration of the School of Foreign Service’s (SFS) first decade of existence consists of its own unique silences and amplifications, as would anyone else’s, a decision exemplified by the title, “America Should Take Her Share.” The quotation originates from the first document intensively studied during research on this article, one that was effectively “silenced” via its omission from earlier histories of Georgetown University and the School of Foreign Service.

This document was a letter sent to Roy S. MacElwee, dean of the School of Foreign Service, by the U.S. embassy in Constantinople on May 13, 1922.³ The school was less than three years old at the time, yet the letter’s contents and historical context reveal its already considerable impression on the United States’ overseas

capabilities. Written by the embassy’s third secretary, the letter shared U.S. Rear Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol’s gratitude for the school’s dedication toward American interests in the “Near East.”⁴ As a vocational college predominantly concerned with instructing undergraduates for foreign trade careers, rather than the all-encompassing approach to international relations it is known for today, the School of Foreign Service valuably trained competent young men who would fill the ranks of overseas government offices and business postings responsible for managing American international commerce.⁵

In 1919, the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, Rear Admiral William S. Sims, entrusted Bristol to safeguard U.S. economic expansion through beneficial relations with Turkey, a disgraced empire undergoing intense political uncertainty after its defeat as a member of the Central Powers during World War I.⁶ The United States never declared war on Turkey when it joined the Allies in 1917. Nor did the United States participate in the postwar treaties led by France and Great Britain that split up Turkey’s territory.⁷ Thus, eager to take advantage of Great Britain’s poor reputation in Turkey, Sims and Bristol together saw an opportunity for the United States to replace its seafaring rival as the leading commercial power in the Eastern Mediterranean.⁸ To fulfill his orders, Bristol took the image of Americans before Turkish nationals into careful consideration. He supplied aid resources and personnel to Turkey with utmost sincerity, but the cunning admiral also understood that the soft humanitarian power

1 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (New York, NY: Beacon, 1995): xii, 48.

2 Trouillot, *Silencing the Past.*, 48.

3 Third Secretary of Embassy, Assistant to the High Commissioner to Roy S. MacElwee, May 13, 1922, SFS 1922 File, School of Foreign Service Box 1 (1919–1929), Booth Family Center for Special Collections, Joseph Mark Lauinger Memorial Library, Georgetown University, Washington, District of Columbia.

4 “Near East” in this context referred to Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern regions. At the time of the letter, Bristol was both the American High Commissioner to Turkey and the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. See Thomas A. Bryson, “Mark L. Bristol, an Open-Door Diplomat in Turkey,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 5, no. 4 (1974): 451.

5 Third Secretary to MacElwee, May 13, SFS 1922, 1922 File, SFSB1, BFCSC.

6 Bryson, “Mark L. Bristol,” 454.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

of the American missionary, the school teacher, and the relief worker were perfect ancillaries to exposing Turkish markets to the American businessman.⁹ Moreover, Bristol felt that the growth of U.S. commercial relations with Turkey would simultaneously compel it to adopt the “benefits of modern civilization,” specifically referencing good governance, religious liberty, universal education, and—“at some future time”—even self-determination.¹⁰ The historian Thomas A. Bryson sums up Bristol’s diplomatic performance as one that “aggressively employ[ed] the Open-Door principle in the traditional manner to defend and extend American economic enterprise,” albeit one much less intrusive than the competing Allied imperial powers.¹¹

Bristol’s intentions in Turkey sharply mirrored those disseminated at the School of Foreign Service five thousand miles away. Given the brevity of his correspondence with MacElwee, Bristol’s liaison did not delve into the granular details on how the School of Foreign Service would benefit their mission in the Near East, but he reported that the admiral gladly awaited the future performances of its graduates.¹² Bristol’s objectives on U.S. commercial interests and racial interactions in the region reverberated across the letter. The secretary foremost noted “how important it is that America should take her share in the development of the great natural resources” and grumbled that the men currently representing American interests abroad lacked the training of “how to deal with other races.”¹³ Administrators of the School of Foreign Service in downtown Washington, DC—only blocks away from the nexuses of American international power at the Department of Commerce and the Department of State—shared the secretary’s attitudes. They eagerly viewed the world shaken by World War I as a global market ripe for commercial opportunity, a world that also required great tact to handle the “racial prejudices and antipathies” of foreign peoples.¹⁴ Across the 1920s, the School of Foreign Service would continue to loyally facilitate

the needs of American commerce and business in the world’s peripheral regions, foremostly Latin America, but also Russia, East Asia, and others. Silences on this intricate interwar entanglement between American global ascendancy and higher education at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service—such as the 1922 Bristol–MacElwee correspondence—are where this article intervenes.

INTRODUCTION

F

OUNDED IN 1919 as the first permanent American school to specialize in international affairs, Georgetown University’s

School of Foreign Service (SFS) uniquely anticipated trends that the United States’ post-World War I geopolitical standing would require the training of young men to manage its overseas prowess. Across the next ten years, through the funding and guidance of various American institutions such as the U.S. Steel Corporation and the Department of Commerce, the School of Foreign Service emerged as a platform to project U.S. imperial ambitions abroad. Administrators, faculty, and students each facilitated the labor and ideology to imagine and promote a global market advantageous for the rising nation. This inquiry primarily examines the relationship between the school’s pedagogical mission and the United States’ desire to expand its commercial interests into the peripheral regions of the world during the first decade of the interwar period. This research on the School of Foreign Service’s origins hopes to encourage more scrutiny on the school’s impact on the global arena and generally assist broader historical scholarship in situating the American university within the global

9 *Ibid.*, 455–456.

10 Bristol to Lewis Heck, 25 Feb. 1920, box 37, Bristol papers, quoted in *Ibid.*, 458.

11 *Ibid.*, 466.

12 Third Secretary to MacElwee, 1922.

13 *Ibid.*

14 Thomas I. Gasson, “Congratulations from the Sick Room,” 1922, SFS 1922 File, SFSB1, BFCSC.

political economy.

This article is not the first work on the origins of the School of Foreign Service. This article's literature review came across seven secondary source texts on Georgetown University, the School of Foreign Service, or Edmund A. Walsh—probably the singular most important figure in SFS history—across the relevant timeframe. Patrick J. McNamara's *A Catholic Cold War: Edmund A. Walsh, S.J., and the Politics of American Catholic Anticommunism* is by far the most analytically rich book on the School of Foreign Service's origins despite only covering it for a chapter.¹⁵ McNamara takes up a uniquely critical approach on the School of Foreign Service among secondary sources: he identifies Walsh's moral celebration of American constitutionalism and Christendom—an ideological formation he stamped onto the early School of Foreign Service—as the nascent form of the radical anticommunist views he developed over the next thirty years.¹⁶

There is a broad literature gap on histories of American higher education's ties to U.S. foreign relations during the interwar period. Except for the two world wars, nearly every scholarly contribution to this topic focuses on the Cold War, a period when national defense and security funding flooded almost every department in the humanities and sciences. Australian historian Tamson Pietsch documents transcontinental scholarly networks across the British Empire from 1850 to 1939, but no equivalent comprehensive book-length study exists of how American universities interacted with the world or even its colonies before 1945.¹⁷ Coincidentally, Pietsch very recently released another

book partly addressing this gap only weeks before the article's completion, *The Floating University: Experience, Empire, and the Politics of Knowledge*, which narrates an unsuccessful attempt in 1926 to tour five hundred American college students on a worldwide ship voyage.¹⁸ The "Floating University" intended to prepare these students for cosmopolitan leadership in the aftermath of World War I amidst a rising United States, albeit far less successfully than the School of Foreign Service's more grounded efforts in Washington, DC.¹⁹ However, only two historical works act as contextual pieces for inquiries of U.S. imperial power and knowledge regarding the 1920s: Ido Oden's chronological outline of the earliest schools of international affairs in the United States, and Ricardo Salvatore's research on the "disciplinary conquest" of Latin America by early twentieth century U.S. scholars.²⁰ Alongside Pietsch's recent book and Oren's article, this article could act as an early case study within the historiography of the U.S. university and U.S. foreign policy prior to the Cold War—ideally these works could eventually inspire a more comprehensive history in book form that would cover these ties from the late nineteenth century up to World War II, the half-a-century period that preceded the United States' establishment as a global superpower. Hopefully, this article is also first step toward building a more interrogative history of Georgetown University's and the School of Foreign Service's international affairs—with nearly two hundred-and-fifty years of history across the university's existence and over one hundred years for the school's, the brief forteen year period covered in this article is a mere fraction of the future potential

15 Louis J. Gallagher, *Edmund A. Walsh, S.J.: A Biography* (New York, NY: Benzinger Brothers, Inc., 1959); Patrick J. McNamara, "Edmund A. Walsh: Bostonian, Jesuit, Activist, and Educator," 1-22 in *A Catholic Cold War: Edmund A. Walsh, S.J., and the Politics of American Catholic Anticommunism* (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2005).

16 McNamara, *A Catholic Cold War*, 89, 134-135.

17 Tamson Pietsch, *Empire of Scholars: Universities, Networks, and the British Academic World, 1850-1939* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2013).

18 Pietsch, *The Floating University: Experience, Empire, and the Politics of Knowledge* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2013).

19 Ibid.

20 Ido Oden, "Schools of International Affairs in the United States: A Historical Sketch," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* (2020): 1-20; Ricardo Salvatore, *Disciplinary Conquest: U.S. Scholars in South America, 1900-1945* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016).

for historical scholarship. Gratefully, a few texts offered useful interpretations of the terms “imperial” and “imperialism” that were both academically rigorous and suitably applicable to the early School of Foreign Service. In summary, these works generally interpret imperialism as the reproduction of hierarchical relationships between hegemonic core countries holding considerable political or economic sway over less powerful peripheral countries. However, they also understand that imperialism as a social relation was not necessarily territorial, totalizing, or even deliberate. The first relevant work is Paul A. Kramer’s essential 2011 article, “Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the World.”²¹ Kramer is pragmatically concerned with what the “imperial” implies for studies of United States in the world rather than a completely consistent transhistorical definition.²² Nonetheless, he does provide the following general description of what he means by imperial; while vague, it was still a useful analytical heuristic for the article:

*Here the imperial refers to a dimension of power in which asymmetries in the scale of political action, regimes of spatial ordering, and modes of exceptionalizing difference enable and produce relations of hierarchy, discipline, dispossession, extraction, and exploitation.*²³

There are five key components of this definition: 1.) orders of scale, whether based around military, economic, political, or cultural power; 2.) the re-organization of space, whether expressed through changes in physical territory, institutions, networks, or ideological discourses; 3.) the exceptionalization of difference, usually through hierarchical gradations such as class, race, and gender; 4.) an emphasis on consequences, regardless of any deliberate intention to enact them; and 5.) a view of the imperial as a category of analysis rather than purely as an entity, the definition’s most overarching aspect.²⁴ Whether securing territorial

conquest or more informal political and economic dominance, both of which the United States participated in, Kramer’s broad imperial framework is core to this article. His observation that the actions of empires often lack or deny consciously “imperialist” motivations is especially useful. Officials at Georgetown University and the School of Foreign Service never explicitly advocated for an “American empire” between 1915 and 1929, but the global repercussions and affiliations of the School of Foreign Service certainly fit within the parameters of the above-mentioned “imperial.”

Furthermore, institutions such as the School of Foreign Service foremost took advantage of the United States’ postwar ascendency into an “informal” imperialism of economic domination rather than a “territorial” imperialism of conquest or annexation traditionally affiliated with the term.

The School of Foreign Service’s ideological frameworks that backed this imperial mission brings us to the second relevant work on imperialism I came across in my research: the previously mentioned 2016 book by Ricardo Salvatore, *Disciplinary Conquest: U.S. Scholars in South America, 1900–1945*.²⁵ Latin America was by far the most important region to the early School of Foreign Service’s interests, so Salvatore’s research on the “imperiality” of knowledge gathered by five early U.S. scholars of Latin American is especially helpful. In fact, one of these five scholars, the political scientist Leo Stanton Rowe, was a lecturer at the School of Foreign Service and is a key figure for this article’s arguments. Salvatore’s approach to the “imperial” is more epistemological than Kramer’s. In the context of early Latin American studies, Salvatore understands the imperial as the accumulation of local information across peripheral Latin American countries into a more comprehensible and practical knowledge for scholars, diplomats, politicians, and businessmen in the United States.²⁶ More specifically, “the sense of hegemony,

21 Kramer, “Review: Essay Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the World,” *The American Historical Review* 116, no. 5 (December 2011): 1348–1391.

22 *Ibid.*, 1348.

23 *Ibid.*, 1348–1349.

24 *Ibid.*

25 Salvatore, *Disciplinary Conquest*.

26 *Ibid.*, 8, 14.

exemplarity, and purported cultural and technological superiority" among scholars from major American research universities facilitated knowledge production of early Latin American studies.²⁷ This accumulated research was a precondition to making authoritative institutional assessments of Latin America, and deepened U.S. government and business involvement in the region.²⁸ Knowledge production at the early School of Foreign Service, which heavily interpreted the world as a potential marketplace that SFS graduates would unfurl to the winds of American free market commerce, relied upon an adjacent imperial project.

Chapter One begins with World War I, which sparked the possible conditions for the School of Foreign Service. Support for American war efforts in Europe encouraged Georgetown's leadership to reevaluate its relationship with the country's growing interests and responsibilities overseas. It specifically explains how Edmund A. Walsh first segued these wartime considerations into a far deeper formal partnership between the state and Georgetown University following the conflict's end. To further contextualize the intentions of the new institution that Walsh headed, I step back and introduce Constantine E. McGuire, an international trade bureaucrat who had the original idea of a foreign service school in the nation's capital in 1915. Georgetown University President John B. Creeden approved of McGuire's plan in June 1918 and assigned Edmund A. Walsh to oversee and promote the project's execution in November 1918, a role that Walsh would resolutely fulfill across the next three decades. From the first sessions of its preliminary single semester in February 1919 to its formal inaugural welcoming ceremony on November 25, 1919, the School of Foreign Service immediately established itself as an ideological apparatus for advancing the United States' foreign commercial interests.

Chapter Two elaborates how this chiefly vocational, undergraduate-focused mission of the early School of Foreign Service strayed massively from McGuire's original proposal. He intended for a far more ambitious plan: an advanced studies institute that would attract academics and policymakers across the

Western Hemisphere. A disappointed McGuire eventually severed his formal ties with the School of Foreign Service, but his continual—at many points amusing—interactions with Georgetown leadership reveal how he maintained his ambitions for a leading international institute. Beyond this focus on individual figures, this chapter more importantly emphasizes the driving imperialist characteristic of the School of Foreign Service: its staunch promotion of interpreting the world as a market. Most SFS graduates entered foreign government and business offices at low-ranking positions. However, this commercialist conviction also threads to more coercive U.S. behavior abroad during the interwar period, foremostly its occupations of countries in Central America and the Caribbean.

Chapter Three records the School of Foreign Service as it enthusiastically approached its tenth anniversary in 1929. This chapter specifically focuses on how affiliates of School of Foreign Service approached questions of imperialism and anti-imperialism, from formal territorial colonialism in the Philippines to informal economic empire in Cuba and Nicaragua. Chapter Three ends with a contrast of two speeches. The first SFS professor John Halladay Latané lecture at the Fourth Conference on the Cause and Cure of War in 1929 that explicitly criticized U.S. foreign policy as imperialist. The second is U.S. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg's address to the School of Foreign Service at the SFS Tenth Anniversary Commencement, a far more celebratory and optimistic oration on the United States' global impact. This article concludes with a comparison Georgetown University's and the School of Foreign Service's international history to William Appleman Williams's classic work, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, as well as a plea for future scholars to take up similar critical histories of American higher education in the future. This plea addresses the potential for histories of both U.S. universities at-large and of Georgetown University and the School of Foreign Service in particular.

27 Ibid., 13.

28 Ibid., 5.

1. AN “ALLIANCE OF KNOWLEDGE AND POWER”

The Idea and Foundation of the School of Foreign Service, 1915-1919

THIS CHAPTER CONTEXTUALIZES the School of Foreign Service as an addition to Georgetown University established in the immediate aftermath of World War I. The unprecedented level of support that the university offered to U.S. war efforts provided an organizational and ideological model for the continuation of such support to its nation during peacetime. Three distinct Georgetown affiliates were paramount during these years of this development: Constantine E. McGuire, Edmund A. Walsh, and John B. Creeden. Patrick McNamara aptly summarizes up the trio's contributions to the School of Foreign Service's beginning: “McGuire was the expert, Walsh the activist, and Creeden the educator.”²⁹ Even within the first year of the School of Foreign Service's creation, the school's dedication to commercial policy and trade is overwhelmingly apparent: curriculum, course materials, and administrators' public statements each reinforced the predominant importance of advancing U.S. economic interests in the global sphere.

World War I and Peacetime Reconstruction

Prior to any serious consideration of a foreign service school, Georgetown's leadership had a far more existential concern related to the United States' foreign affairs. When the United States entered World War in 1917, Georgetown officials feared that lackluster support for the war, combined with the university's Jesuit management, would harm the national reputation of the Society of Jesuits.³⁰ American higher education was largely ambivalent to the conflict upon its outbreak in 1914, but by Congress's declaration of war three years later, it resolutely backed the Allied powers under the framework of a moral struggle against the evils of autocracy and militarism.³¹ In November 1917, Georgetown President Alphonsus J. Donlon warned Father Provincial Anthony J. Maas, his superior as the head of the Society of Jesuit's Maryland Province, that the society would lose credibility and public influence within the United States if it did not make a stronger showing of support for the war effort.³² Donlon further feared that other Americans would whisper doubts over their loyalty to the nation's cause: “there is no doubt people are talking and their criticism is growing and before long may take an unfriendly coloring.”³³ Donlon suggested that Mass make a few bureaucratic rearrangements within the society as well as supply the U.S. military with more Jesuit chaplains, especially as government officials made “an earnest effort to stamp out vice in the vicinity of the camps.”³⁴ In his return message, Maas agreed with Donlon's concerns that to avoid public mistrust amidst these exceptional times, “one must give external manifestation of his patriotism.”³⁵

World War I resulted in a tremendous

29 McNamara, *A Catholic Cold War*, 19.

30 Curran, *The Quest for Excellence*, 78.

31 Gruber, *Mars and Minerva*, 78–82.

32 Alphonsus J. Donlon, SJ to Anthony J. Maas, SJ, November 27, 1917, 1, MPA Correspondence, Subject—Georgetown University, Presidential Office (1917–1918), Box 29 Financial Records, Maryland Province Archive.

33 *Ibid.*, 2.

34 *Ibid.*, 1–2.

35 Maas, SJ to Donlon, SJ, November 1917, MPA Correspondence, Subject—Georgetown University, Presidential Office (1917–1918), B29FR, MPA.

institutional transformation at Georgetown University, one faced by higher education across the nation. The sheer organizational requirements of tracking massive inventories of men, equipment, and funding for the U.S. military prompted a nationwide standardization of university bureaucracies.³⁶ Furthermore, although Georgetown University always felt a close symbolic attachment to the U.S. government due to its proximity to the nation's capital and establishment in 1789, the same year as the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, World War I marked an unprecedented development in the university's growing alignment with the government's overseas directives.³⁷ Even during the American Civil War, Georgetown administrators did not take up the nation's cause with nearly as much vigor, fearing an anti-Catholic backlash if they took a staunch position on a matter as divisive as succession³⁸. Half a century later, united against a foreign enemy and seeing the opportunity to prove its patriotism, Georgetown zealously rallied behind the American war machine. This campaign permanently expanded the degree to which Georgetown attached itself to the national government's overseas interests.

These nationalistic trends reveal themselves within a 1918 correspondence between W. Coleman Nevils, the dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, and President Creeden.³⁹ Nevils writes the letter as an ode to the intimate connection between the United States and Georgetown since the foundation of both entities in 1789: "We Americans love to trace the history of our country's growth; we feel a thrill of exultation at every new increase in her powerfulness."⁴⁰ Nevils marks each major war of the growing nation with a corresponding expansion of the university: the War of 1812

(1812–1815) with Georgetown's charter (1815), the Mexican-American War (1846–1848) with the establishment of the School of Medicine (1851) and the Graduate School (1855), the Civil War (1861–1865) with the School of Law (1870), and the Spanish-American War (1898) with Georgetown Hospital (1898) and the School of Dentistry (1901). Consistent with this tradition of American military prowess and Georgetown's expansion, he anticipated the advent of the School of Foreign Service next year as a celebratory outcome of a world battered by the war that needs a United States to push it toward liberty and peace.

The last war mentioned by Nevils—the war with Spain—also marks a geographic narrative departure from continental growth à la Manifest Destiny to overseas affairs. As a subsequent step, World War I exposed the United States to novel global realities and responsibilities. Now, the United States must unroll its commercial prestige to distant lands and maintain exemplary standards for conducting consular and trade services. Nevils eagerly felt that the newly inaugurated School of Foreign Service was up to the task for fulfilling America's new expectations as a major player in the world arena. He concluded with the exuberant statement, "As our country has expanded so have we. America, thou hast no more loyal institution than Georgetown."⁴¹ Nevil's excitement corresponds well with historian Mark R. Nemeć's observations that university administrators were eager and zealous entrepreneurs who took the initiative to push forward nationalist interests; they were not merely compliant attendants to the educational policies of the state.⁴² McNamara further noted that Georgetown's initiative on the School of Foreign Service was a rare occurrence where a Catholic

36 Clyde W. Barrow, *Universities and the Capitalist State: Corporate Liberalism and the Reconstruction of American Higher Education, 1894–1928* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990): 146.

37 Curran, *The Bicentennial History of Georgetown University: From Academy to University, 1789–1889*, Volume 1, 3 volumes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1993): 349.

38 Curran, *The Quest for Excellence*, 78.

39 William Coleman Nevils to Creeden, 1918, SFS 1918 File, SFSB1, BFCSC.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Mark R. Nemeć, *Ivy Towers and Nationalist Minds: Universities, Leadership, and the Development of the American State* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006): 24.

college anticipated rather than acted upon broader trends among American universities.⁴³ Despite the United States' rapid commercial and territorial expansion since the latter-half of the nineteenth-century, the U.S. government had no official foreign service until the Rogers Act established one in 1924. Attaining diplomatic positions before World War I relied more on political connections than training in a formal educational environment taught at a university.⁴⁴ U.S. diplomats' positions required far more expertise and training after the war as international trade necessitated more government supervision and assistance to American businessmen, such as the cementing of contracts with foreign governments and attuning businesses to local customs and traditions.⁴⁵

Edmund A. Walsh embodied the transition of this collaboration into peacetime conditions. At the age of thirty-two, the industrious Jesuit joined Georgetown's faculty in May 1918, having obtained his priesthood two years earlier.⁴⁶ As a Student Army Training Corps regional inspector, Walsh was responsible for training student cadets into officers during the war.⁴⁷ Walsh's wartime experience convinced him of the need for a professional cohort specializing in global commerce that would rally for peace instead of war. He would later call this ambition, "the West Point for Foreign Service and a national clearinghouse of foreign trade information."⁴⁸ Walsh's dramatic personality and theatrical aura—often wearing a flowing black cape

on campus or posing for photographs against world maps and globes—made him the perfect mouthpiece for Georgetown's latest addition.⁴⁹ Creeden hired Walsh knowing that the enthusiastic priest had the elite know-how and activist fervor to seek out and encourage prominent scholars, businessmen, and government officials to join the School of Foreign Service either as faculty members or donors.⁵⁰ Following Creeden's orders, Walsh quickly secured political and financial backing from the U.S. Shipping Board and the Department of Commerce' Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce.⁵¹ Within half a year, Walsh attained the \$500,000 recommended by the prospective school's endowment board, an amount almost quadruple that of Georgetown University's entire endowment.⁵²

Walsh's remarkable ability to scrap together the necessary talents and resources for the foreign service school would lead his friend and later biographer Louis J. Gallagher to write, "There can be no doubt as to who did the plow work, the irrigation, the harvesting, and the marketing of this new field of education, once the university decided to take it over. Father Walsh was Georgetown."⁵³ The historical consensus and public record rightfully credit Walsh as the individual most responsible for the successful implementation of the School of Foreign Service, but to better understand the imperial character of the school's foundation, it is also necessary to introduce Constantine E. McGuire and his original vision for the school.

43 McNamara, *A Catholic Cold War*, xv; Oden, "Schools of International Affairs," 21.

44 Robert D. Schulzinger, *The Making of the Diplomatic Mind: The Training, Outlook and Style of United States Foreign Service Officers, 1908–1931* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1975): 3–15.

45 Barnes and Morgan, *The Foreign Service of the United States: Origins, Development and Functions* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1969): 196–97.

46 *Ibid.*, 2.

47 Curran, *The Quest for Excellence*, 82.

48 Edmund A. Walsh, SJ, "Systematic Training for Foreign Service," Address Delivered at Annual Convention American Manufacturers Export Association, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York City, October 17, 1919, MPA Correspondence, Subject—Georgetown University, Presidential Office (1919), B29FR, MPA, 1–12.

49 McNamara, *A Catholic Cold War*, 15–16.

50 *Ibid.*, 18.

51 Creeden to Rockwell, Washington, January 25, 1919, H-1, MPARP; *Woodstock Letters* 48, no. 1 (1919):

52 Curran, *The Quest for Excellence*, 91.

53 Italics in original document. Gallagher, Edmund A. Walsh, 2.

Constantine E. McGuire, the Initiator of the School of Foreign Service

Constantine McGuire embodied much of his nation's exciting newfound global aspirations. Born in Boston on April 4, 1890, McGuire quickly grew into elite circles as a young man, earning his bachelors, masters, and doctorate degrees from Harvard University.⁵⁴ During a 1913–1914 traveling fellowship that funded his studies across Europe, McGuire encountered France's National Institute for Oriental Languages and Civilizations, an impressive global-orientated university that was his initial inspiration for an equivalent institution in the United States.⁵⁵ Upon receiving his Ph.D. from Harvard in 1915, McGuire solemnly discovered that the university's religious prejudices barred any Catholic from teaching medieval history at Harvard, dashing his dreams of becoming a professor.⁵⁶ Later that year, he joined the Inter-American High Commission in Washington, DC as a research assistant, and within a few months, McGuire became the commission's assistant secretary general.⁵⁷ McGuire's main role was presiding over the commission's jurists and financers; men who helped stabilized exchange rates and disposed of regulatory obstacles to business relations between the twenty republics of the Western Hemisphere.⁵⁸ It was in this prestigious position that McGuire cultivated several of the connections that soon prompted his foreign service school proposal. McGuire was very well-connected, with friendships across

the world with Vatican cardinals, U.S. Naval College generals and admirals, and Swedish billionaire Axel Wenner-Gren, among other notably powerful individuals and organizations.⁵⁹ His friends even rumored that behind the scenes, McGuire was among the most influential Catholic layman in the United States, acting as a financial counsel to the papacy and supposedly convincing the Vatican to move its gold security holdings from the United States the summer before the 1929 Wall Street Crash.⁶⁰ McGuire was also notorious for his passionately opinionated personality. After he passed away in 1965, C. S. Tenley—McGuire's close friend and stenographer at the Inter-American High Commission (and a 1924 SFS graduate)—recalled that McGuire "had given a complete dressing down" to political and legal figures as prominent as a Supreme Court justice, a White House Cabinet secretary, and a Latin American president. Knowing that McGuire hated the small talk and gossip among the "magpies" at Georgetown, Tenley joked that if McGuire were able to read his obituary by Georgetown Professor Carroll Quigley, who suspensefully titled it, "Constantine McGuire: Man of Mystery," he would have had Quigley "stretched" in the woods behind the campus grounds.⁶¹

Despite his fondness for everything high status, McGuire hated dragging attention to himself. Outside of their affiliations with the powerful, his personality was the complete opposite of the bombastic Walsh, whose showmanship was one of the main reasons that McGuire accepted Walsh's execution of the school plan.⁶² He was so determined to stay outside of the public spotlight that few of McGuire's obituaries

54 Carroll Quigley, "Constantine McGuire: Man of Mystery," *Foreign Service Courier* 14, no. 2 (December 1965): 12. For a similar pre-Georgetown biographic account of Edmund A. Walsh, see McNamara, *A Catholic Cold War*, 7–13.

55 Quigley, "Constantine McGuire," *Ibid.*

56 *Ibid.*, 13.

57 *Ibid.*

58 "Memorandum concerning the qualification of C.E. E. McGuire to be certified to take the examination for admission to the Bar in the District of Columbia," 1920, 1–2, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC.

59 C. S. Tenley to Joseph M. Jeffs, March 22, 1979, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC, 2.

60 Quigley, "Constantine McGuire," 12. Selections from W. Somerset Maugham, *The Razor's Edge* (New York City, NY: Doubleday, Doran, 1944).

61 Tenley to Jeffs, March 22, 1979, 1–3.

62 McNamara, *A Catholic Cold War*, 13–16.

mentioned his ties to the School of Foreign Service except for Quigley's article, which sought to correct this record.⁶³ In a letter to the Georgetown archivist, Tenley clarified that contrary to the enticing subtitle, "Man of Mystery," McGuire made no effort to cultivate an aura of mystery surrounding his contributions to the School of Foreign Service, but "only a desire to work without interruption, publicity, or fanfare."⁶⁴ Never referring to himself as the "founder of the SFS," McGuire always duly credited Walsh as the paramount genius behind the school, who remained a close lifelong friend of his even after McGuire's later falling out with the school.⁶⁵ Even when Georgetown officials offered to award McGuire with an honorary degree in 1953 and name a student loan fund after him in 1958 for his services to the university, he declined the distinctions on principle.⁶⁶

McGuire thoroughly explains the background of the School of Foreign Service's creation in an April 19, 1953 letter he sent to William F. Maloney, the newly selected father provincial of the Jesuits' Maryland Province.⁶⁷ McGuire first drew up the school's plan in 1916–1917 and shared it with Thomas I. Gasson, graduate dean of sociology, and President John B. Creeden of Georgetown University.⁶⁸ Nothing materialized from this meeting, however, because Creeden told McGuire that Georgetown would be unable to take on such a sizeable project. McGuire then suggested the "Consular and Diplomatic School" to Catholic University

President Thomas J. Shahan in 1918. Outraged that anti-clerical movements across Latin America diminished the Church's power in the region and that American Catholics were a rare presence across the nation's diplomatic and consular corps, McGuire's proposal for Catholic University took on a more passionately denominational character than at Georgetown.⁶⁹ Nonetheless, he received a similar rejection from Shahan.⁷⁰

A few months later on May 16, 1918, Constantine McGuire enclosed a memorandum disclosing more details of the school to Father Richard H. Tierney, the editor of leading Catholic magazine *America* and a personal acquaintance of Creeden, and asked him to pass on the proposal to Creeden if he found it worthwhile.⁷¹ McGuire again shared his deliberate desire for a Catholic institution to host the school, finding the lack of Catholics in U.S. diplomatic and consular services to be a sign of constant negligence in advancing transnational Catholic cooperation: "It is essential to the unity of Catholics of this hemisphere that a layer proportion—at least half!—of our representatives (diplomatic and consular) in Latin America should be Catholic."⁷² With a graduate-level institution in mind, McGuire believed that Georgetown would attract Catholics across Canada and Latin America to the foreign service school.⁷³ This prestigious facility would eventually become a source of diplomats for the U.S. Department of State, supplanting the elite white Anglo-Saxon Protestant

63 "Obituary: Constantine E. McGuire," *The Galley* 46, no. 3 (1966), Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC; Patrick F. Scanlas, "Managing Editor's Desk: Dr. Constantine McGuire," *Brooklyn Tablet*, October 28, 1965, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BUSC; "Mass for Constantine McGuire," *Brooklyn Tablet*, October 28, 1965, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BUSC.

64 Tenley to Jeffs, March 22, 1979, 1.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid., 3; McGuire to George S. Roper, June 26, 1958, Constantine McGuire Papers Folder, CMP, BUSC, 1–3.

67 McGuire to William F. Maloney, SJ, April 19, 1953, Constantine McGuire Folder, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC, 2–4.

68 Ibid., 2.

69 Constantine E. McGuire to Thomas J. Shahan, "The Consular and Diplomatic School of the Catholic University of America," 1918, 1–3, SFS 1918 (?) Memo on Origins of SFS File, SFSB1, BFCSC, 1.

70 Ibid.

71 McGuire to Richard H. Tierney, May 16, 1918, 1–3, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC, 1.

72 Ibid., 1–2.

73 Ibid., 2.

(WASP) stronghold held over the profession.⁷⁴

McGuire was sure that wealthy American Catholics interested in foreign trade would contribute to the school's endowment. McGuire's list of proposed funders featured some of the United States' most powerful and affluent businesspersons across a number of industries, including James A. Farrell, president of the U.S. Steel Corporation; Charles M. Schwab, president of Bethlehem Steel; Edward L. Doheny, founder of the Pan American Petroleum and Transport Company; and Frederic C. Penfield, a former U.S. diplomat married to Anne Weightman, one of the world's wealthiest women.⁷⁵ When Tierney got back to McGuire, he informed him that Creeden would like to meet him and recount the project once more. During this second offer, Creeden and McGuire confirmed the plan for a foreign service school and awaited the war's armistice to officially place it into effective action.⁷⁶ The day after, Creeden appointed Walsh for the task, having returned from his work with the Student Army Training Corps. McGuire highly respected Walsh's commitment to the school, commenting that, "Whatever the School is, he has made it."⁷⁷

McGuire had little responsibility for framing the policy of the early School of Foreign Service beyond a few key tasks in its first years. He helped select many of its first faculty members, such as three refugees from the Russian Revolution—Michael I. Rostovtseff, Michael Karpovich, and Baron Korff—as well as two general secretaries of the Inter-American High Commission—Guillermo A. Sherwell and Leo Stanton

Rowe.⁷⁸ He also originally induced James A. Farrell—the president of the United States Steel Corporation, chairman of the National Foreign Trade Council, and a prominent anti-union industrialist—into dedicating \$20,000 to the school's endowment.⁷⁹ Farrell would be among the school's most dedicated supporters until his death in 1948. However, McGuire's other career commitments, first as an economist for the Brookings Institute and then for various Latin American governments, as well as the caretaking of his dependent elderly relatives, partly explain why he decreased his involvement with the school.⁸⁰ But even more importantly, the school's undergraduate focus heavily dissuaded him from any deeper association. Unlike the graduate level institutions that impressed McGuire in Europe, the SFS program prioritized the vocational knowledge of trade before any general study of foreign affairs.⁸¹ The early School of Foreign Service did offer Masters and Doctorate degrees in Foreign Service, but this was a minor component of what was in essence a pre-professional international commerce school.⁸²

McGuire did not anticipate that the school he originally envisioned would overwhelmingly specialize in training students for employment within trade activities such as accounting and shipping. He felt that those more rudimentary subjects were far more suitable for the "great commercial centers for foreign trade" such as New York City, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and New Orleans, but not Washington, DC. McGuire expected the School of Foreign Service to intensively address the most pressing and complex issues of international

74 Tenley to Jeffs, March 22, 1979, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC, 2.

75 Ibid., 3.

76 McGuire to Maloney, SJ, April 19, 1953, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC, 1.

77 Ibid.

78 Quigley, "Constantine McGuire: Man of Mystery," 15. Other prominent early SFS faculty featured acclaimed experts Ernest L. Bogart in economics, W. F. Willoughby in public administration, James Brown Scott in international law, and Stephen P. Duggan in diplomatic history.

79 Ibid.

80 McGuire to Maloney, April 19, 1953, 3.

81 "Preliminary Statement" in The Georgetown University School of Foreign Service Peace Bulletin, no. 6 (April 1919), SFS 1918-1919 File, SFSB1, BFCSC, 19.

82 The Committee on Graduate Studies, "Rules for Graduate Work in the School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University," 1919, SFS 1918-1919 File, SFSB1, BFCSC, 1.

affairs.⁸³ Thus, McGuire formally severed his direct ties with the School of Foreign Service on May 4, 1921, when he informed President Creeden of his member resignation from the SFS Advisory Committee.⁸⁴ While reluctant given McGuire's essential services to the school during its first two years, Creeden accepted the request.⁸⁵ Walsh found McGuire's decision understandable, but it also sincerely upset him, and he hoped that his friend would someday permit Georgetown to feature his name as one of the School of Foreign Service's founders.⁸⁶

The School of Foreign Service's 1st Year

By January 25, 1919, Creeden confirmed that the prospective School of Foreign Service attained substantive investment from the U.S. government; the national shipping board was especially enthusiastic and wished to establish Georgetown as "the Shipping School for the Nation." The board even sent forty batches of four-month shipping courses to Georgetown and offered to pay for the tuitions of students trained at the school.⁸⁷ In another letter with the father provincial, Creeden remarked on the fortuitous geographic location of Georgetown University: no city could equal Washington, DC for its access to U.S. government officials and representatives from foreign countries that the school could hire as experts to teach the student

body. In touch with his predecessor's concerns during World War I, Creeden also assumed that the School of Foreign Service would be a more ambitious step toward preserving the institutional security and professional connections of the Jesuits with powerful American groups: "The school would be in the nature of a continued service to our country and it would bring the Society into contact with the prominent men in finance and in government." Although the United States was no longer in the "abnormal times" of a declared state of war, and suspicions of an unpatriotic Catholic leadership no longer topped the concerns of leadership at Georgetown and the Maryland Provincial, President Creeden's letters demonstrated a sustained eagerness to attach his university to the aims of the national government.⁸⁸

From February to May 1919, Walsh led a preliminary semester for seventy registered students as an experiment before the School of Foreign Service's official inauguration in the fall.⁸⁹ Class registrations and the semester respectively began on February 3 and 17, and tuition for the single semester was \$60.⁹⁰ Registrations for the first full 1919–1920 academic year began on September 17, 1919 with a total annual tuition cost of \$110. While no university dormitories were available for SFS students, Georgetown had a listing of approved boarding housing nearby the downtown Law School campus.⁹¹ Depending on the day, courses were taught between 6:30 p.m. and 9:45 p.m., so that students could find day-time employment at a government or business office.⁹² The school's location at the Law

83 Ibid.

84 McGuire to Creeden, May 4, 1921, Constantine McGuire Papers Folder, CMP, BFCSC, 1.

85 Creeden to McGuire, May 7, 1921, Constantine McGuire Papers Folder, CMP, BFCSC.

86 Walsh to McGuire, July 25, 1921, Constantine McGuire Papers Folder, CMP, BFCSC.

87 Creeden to Donlon, January 25, 1919, MPA Correspondence, Subject—Georgetown University, Presidential Office (1919), B29FR, MPA.

88 Ibid.

89 MacElwee, "The Georgetown Plan of Education for Foreign Trade: An Address Delivered Before the Canadian Clubs of Montreal and Ottawa," January 21 and 22, 1921, GCJ 49 no. 5 (February 1921): 286.

90 "Preliminary Statement" in The Georgetown University School of Foreign Service Peace Bulletin, no. 6 (April 1919), SFS 1918–1919 File, SFSB1, BFCSC, 4.

91 Ibid. The average cost for room and board, laundry, and textbooks and notebooks were \$300, \$25, and \$25, respectively.

92 Ibid., 15.

School building on 506 E Street, NW—while partly disconnected from most undergraduate life at the main campus—also placed it within the immediate vicinity of the Department of State, Department of Commerce, Pan-American Union, Library of Congress, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ideal for anyone wishing to study and engage with U.S. diplomatic and consular services.⁹³

This preliminary semester also consisted of twenty-six faculty members who taught a combined total of thirty classes.⁹⁴ The school split these courses into four divisions: 1.) the Economic and Commercial Group, 2.) the Law and Political Science Group, 3.) the Shipping Group, and 4.) the Language Group, the last of which initially included English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, and Japanese.⁹⁵ While this assortment contained subjects in the humanities and social science, the list of classes “deemed basic and essential” by the school showcased an overwhelming priority of materialist commercial interests.⁹⁶ For instance, the June 1919 final examination for “Latin American Financial and Commercial Problems,” asked students to identify the regional locations of petroleum, cacao, copper, bananas, coal, and sugar to describe how the characteristics of Latin American racial distributions and populations affected commerce.⁹⁷ This initial SFS curriculum thus placed a far higher emphasis on the vocational training of students rather than an education on the high-minded philosophical and legal problems surrounding international liberalism. Highly impressed by Walsh’s conviction and performance during this spring

test run, President Creeden sent a correspondence to the father provincial in July 1919 requesting approval for Walsh to devote his efforts almost exclusively to the Foreign Service School across the next year.⁹⁸ Creeden noted Walsh’s key contributions to marketing the plan for the school among prominent government officials and financial men. Through Walsh’s restless eagerness to complete his SFS tasks; Creeden believed that by the end of the year, the school would acquire an impressive endowment to “exert a wide and important influence.”⁹⁹

Across the first year of the School of Foreign Service’s existence, and despite the differing opinions of its initial leading backers, there was explicit support for U.S. efforts to attain wealth and prosperity abroad. For instance, McGuire delivered a lecture in 1919 for first-year students titled “Some Financial Problems of Latin America,” where he advertised the region’s vast and largely pristine economic opportunities: “like all new parts of the world read for exploitation and development, the Latin American republics are greedy absorbers of capital and generous promisors of re-payment.”¹⁰⁰ McGuire observed that the extensive quantities of agricultural and mineral resources of Latin America were not easily accessible to their host countries due to labor scarcity and the considerable financial costs of extraction, transformation, and transportation of the products into exportable goods. Issuing loans and capital investment for the Latin American republics in order to supply them with mining machinery, port infrastructure, and railroad systems—as European nations had for around fifty years—would be a highly lucrative in-road for the

93 Ibid., 4.

94 “Expenditures 1919-1920,” Georgetown University, Washington DC Estimates, 1919-1922, SFS Academic Exercises Commemorating the Founding of the SFS 1917-1919, SFSB1, BFCSC, 1.

95 Students were expected to have a speaking and written working knowledge in a non-English language to graduate, which was evaluated through an oral examination. “Preliminary Statement: Conspectus of Studies,” in The Georgetown University School of Foreign Service Peace Bulletin, no. 6 (April 1919), BFCSC, 5-6; “Expenditures 1919-1920,” Georgetown University, Washington DC Estimates, 1919-1922, SFS Academic Exercises Commemorating the Founding of the SFS 1917-1919, SFSB1, BFCSC, 1.

96 Ibid.

97 “Latin American Trade Problems,” June 19, 1919, in Yearbook, February 1919-February 1920, 83.

98 Creeden to Maas, July 28, 1919.

99 Ibid.

100 McGuire, “Some Financial Problems of Latin America,” 1919, Constantine McGuire Papers Folder, CMP, BSCS, 3.

United States.¹⁰¹

In an August 20, 1919 invitation sent out to Massachusetts Senator David I. Walsh, McGuire stated that Georgetown University and School of Foreign Service authorities hoped that President Woodrow Wilson could also attend the inaugural ceremony on November 25, 1919, for he had not attended any prior university events.¹⁰² He noted that the school's inauguration, with its symbolic strength as a representation of the United States' expansion and its new responsibilities in the postwar world, would be an opportune moment for Wilson to distinguish the ceremony.¹⁰³ While Wilson never attended the opening ceremony, the event featured each dean of Georgetown University's schools eagerly welcoming the School of Foreign Service as the university's latest newcomer and as a grandiose historical achievement in its own right.¹⁰⁴ Distinguished speakers at the School of Foreign Service Commencement included Adolph C. Miller, member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors; Edwin F. Sweet, acting Secretary of Commerce; and William Phillips, Assistant Secretary of State.¹⁰⁵ The Philadelphia Public Ledger hailed the School of Foreign Service's emergence and endowment backing by James A. Farrell, and expected that the school would have little trouble securing future finances, considering the National Foreign Trade Commission's insistence for a commercial education department "directed specifically to our friendly conquest of Latin America."¹⁰⁶

Dozens of students initially enrolled at the School of Foreign Service: advertisements for employment in foreign trade attracted veterans and other

young men eager to advance into middle class careers.¹⁰⁷ The school's establishment in the immediate aftermath of World War I was also particularly fortuitous: wartime trainings—based upon the fast-paced attainment of multiple vocation skills—resembled the SFS curriculum far more than a standard college education associated with the liberal arts and humanities. While making no direct reference to Georgetown, historian Clyde W Barrow in *Universities and the Capitalist State: Corporate Liberalism and the Reconstruction of American Higher Education, 1894–1928*, noted the irony of this institutional rearrangement, "While the university had pledged itself to make the world safe for democracy, it institutionalized the competing imagery of a militarized wartime production unit."¹⁰⁸ One of Walsh's highest profile appearances shortly after the SFS commencement highlighted this unprecedented collaborative step.¹⁰⁹ In his speech, "Systematic Training for Foreign Service," at the American Manufacturers Export Association Convention in New York City, Walsh explicitly declared that his active participation and representation of Georgetown at the conference, packed with American commerce leaders set on buttressing the growth U.S. foreign trade, was in fact a formal "alliance of Knowledge and Power."¹¹⁰

101 *Ibid.*, 4–5.

102 McGuire to David I. Walsh, August 20, 1919, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC, 1.

103 *Ibid.*, 2.

104 Nevils, Gasson, George M. Kober, George E. Hamilton, and Bruce L. Taylor, "Addresses," *Academic Exercises in Gaston Hall, Part I*, November 25, 1919, 18–26 in *Yearbook, February 1919–February 1920*.

105 Adolph C. Miller, Edwin F. Sweet, and William Phillips, "Addresses," *Academic Exercises in Gaston Hall, Part II*, November 25, 1919, 27–44 in *Yearbook, February 1919–February 1920*.

106 "Editorial: Appreciations of the School of Foreign Service," *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, 78–79 in *Yearbook, February 1919–February 1920*, 78.

107 Barrow, *Universities and the Capitalist State*, 32

108 *Ibid.*, 151.

109 Walsh, SJ, "Systematic Training for Foreign Service," 1–12.

110 *Ibid.*, 1.

2. MAKING THE WORLD A MARKET, 1920-1926

THIS CHAPTER EXPANDS upon the commercialist incentives established at the School of Foreign Service, and elaborates on how school educated students into viewing the world through market-based ideologies. Any foreign nation or people—no matter their physical or cultural distance from DC—were presented as new opportunities for the expansion of American markets. The six years covered in chapter two broadly explore how this trade-inspired crusade was promoted by the School of Foreign Service, how it shaped alumni, and how extaneous global affairs challenged the schools' propagators of the ideology.

Sponsored by *National Geographic*

This chapter begins with a jump ahead to the fall semester of 1924, the fifth year of the School of Foreign Service. On November 21, 1921, Edmund A. Walsh recognized this special occasion with yet another familiarly grandiose speech. At the SFS Fifth Anniversary Commemoration, Walsh delivered a striking ode to the school's foundational motivations born the hour after the World War and "sealed by the blood of the flower of American youth."¹¹¹ He proclaimed that the school valorously engrained traits of true citizenship, pure patriotism, and intelligent service to the world among the SFS student body.¹¹² As this speech indicates, and as

McNamara correctly noted, Walsh never adhered to a total obsession toward capitalist growth and commerce: he clearly advocated for the School of Foreign Service in visceral moral terms committed to internationalism.¹¹³ On the other hand, upon closer study of early SFS educational materials and lectures circulated to students, the institution's paramount concern with expanding U.S. foreign trade ultimately won out over all other motivations.

For example, in the same speech, Walsh listed the various postwar political transformations that made the world a rapidly unfamiliar place. This dynamic was especially dangerous, because to become "the candidate for commercial conquest," the United States must know the world: "he who would bring back the wealth of the Indies must take the wealth of the Indies with him."¹¹⁴ Luckily for Walsh, the School of Foreign Service partly would answer this call during the same semester as his address. This came in the form of a new Applied Geography course officially backed by the National Geographic Society headquartered in Washington, DC and taught by staff members of its publication, *National Geographic Magazine*.

The first lecturer of this course and the senior assistant editor of the magazine, Ralph A. Graves, held views on American commercialism consistent with that of the School of Foreign Service. In 1918, he wrote and published an article advocating for the expansion of the U.S. merchant marine, a consistent SFS talking point that would reach the point of obsession by the end of the 1920s.¹¹⁵ The ideologies he promoted in his Applied Geography class also followed a widespread postwar optimism and faith in American commerce at the time. Many American businessmen believed that consumer products and technological innovations generated by the country's entrepreneurship could simultaneously supply the world's consumption demands while making

¹¹¹ Walsh, "Address," Delivered at Exercises in Commemoration of the Fifth Anniversary of the Founding of the School of Foreign Service, November 21, 1924, SFS 1924 File, SFSB1, BFCSC, 2-3.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ McNamara, *A Catholic Cold War*, 78.

¹¹⁴ Walsh, "Address," November 21, 1924, 6.

¹¹⁵ Ralph A. Graves, "Ships for the Seven Seas: The Story of America's Maritime Needs, Her Capabilities and Her Achievements," *The National Geographic Magazine* 34, no. 3 (September 1918): 165-199.

the United States more prosperous than ever.¹¹⁶

On October 1, 1924, Graves introduced students to the contents of his proposed Applied Geography course in a pamphlet for the 1924–1925 academic year. This document is one of the single most fascinating revelations into the ideological training of SFS undergraduates. At its core are two audacious proclamations: first, that “The world is the American businessman’s market today”; and second, that applied geography, particularly concerning the study of mutual relations between land, natural life, human beings, and technology, “is as essential to selling manufactured goods as chemistry or mechanical engineering is in making them.”¹¹⁷ For Graves, applied geography was not only practical to strengthening American commerce; it had universal utility. According to Graves, an action as minor and insignificant as a boy ascertaining on whether his neighborhoods should use their yards for a vegetable garden or a tennis court, and one as complex and multinational as foreign automobile producers competitively pitching their vehicle sales to the Moroccan government and its newly built road system, are alike dependent on the interpretation of geographic information.¹¹⁸

Graves also emphasized that disregarding applied geography could be very costly. He recalled one anecdote where an American manufacturer delivered a shipment of horse plows to Venezuela, only to learn upon arrival that they were entirely useless in a region reliant upon oxen, costing them \$2,600.¹¹⁹ Conversely, the innovative use of applied geography could overcome cultural obstacles and reap in massive profits from undiscovered markets, such as one hardware salesman in old Latin American cities who discovered that the

ancient cumbersome model for door keys used by locals could be supplemented with a modern American product.¹²⁰ The pamphlet stressed that a shrewd businessman must know local conditions and customs to not only determine what to sell, but how to sell it as well. Eccentric cross-cultural business anecdotes pervaded the document. For example, when an American shoes salesman on a tight time schedule declined a potential Cuban buyer’s invitation to a dinner and opera, he offended his host’s sensibilities so much that it took the shoe company three years to rewin the buyer’s favor.¹²¹ In another even more amusing instance, a German firm once reclaimed an alarm clock market lost by the British in central Africa by discovering that their consumers did not want precise time-telling devices, but machines that made loud clicking sounds!¹²²

One of the benefits to the National Geographic Society sponsorship of the course was that Graves had access to its massive repertoire of photographs from around the world. The eleven photographs he scattered through the pamphlet viscerally demonstrate how the School of Foreign Service encouraged students to imagine the world as a market from which to buy raw materials and sell manufactured goods.¹²³ At first glance, the photographs could not be more unalike; it appears that Graves selected them at random from every corner of the world.¹²⁴ The captions, on the other hand, repeatedly question readers whether any hidden markets exist or why they do not within their above photograph. Under one image of a man riding a goat-driven cart in the Philippines, Graves comments that “the speedometer salesman would starve to death,” and in another of a traditional Cambodian dancing performance, he notes that the “girls are not pining for

116 Eckes and Zeiler, *Globalization and the American Century*, 65.

117 Graves, “Department of Applied Geography, Fall and Spring Semesters, 1924–1925, Tuesdays, 6:50 to 8:15 p.m.” October 1, 1924, SFS 1924 File, SFSB1, BFCSC, 3–4.

118 *Ibid.*, 4.

119 *Ibid.*, 4–5.

120 *Ibid.*, 5.

121 *Ibid.*

122 *Ibid.*, 6.

123 *Ibid.*, 1–8.

124 The image’s locations included China, Japan, the East Indies, the Middle East, southeast Africa, Java, the Philippines, Wales, Cambodia, and Mongolia. See the “Selected Images” section for all eleven images and captions.

ballet slippers and tulle skirts.”¹²⁵ In a photograph of two barefoot African schoolboys each standing on one leg as a form of discipline, Graves snidely remarks, “it would take a long time to develop a market for shoes” for the region.¹²⁶ The caption of every photograph from the pamphlet pushes a market-based interpretation. Similarly, the actual syllabus for the course also centered questions of commercial utility about the world. Every weekly topic of the fall semester’s second half concerns the geography of raw resources such as fabrics, grains, meats, minerals, and other precious materials, and the sole required textbook was *The Business Man’s Geography: A Compendium of General and Post-War Conditions in Respect of Overseas Produce and Overseas Markets*.¹²⁷

Graves was unable to resume his Applied Geography class for the fall of 1925, but fellow National Geographic Magazine editor Jessie Richardson Hildebrand would pick it up over the next three years.¹²⁸ One of Hildebrand’s National Geographic contributions before his SFS hiring was “The Geography of Games,” a sixty-one-illustration collection on how national sports shaped various peoples around the world.¹²⁹ Another highlight was “The Sources of Washington’s Charm,” which featured the humorous application of his geographic sensibilities to Georgetown itself as a “pre-Capitaline civilization,” in reference to its past as a legally separate entity from Washington.¹³⁰ As the main

lecturer, Hildebrand invited exciting guest speakers from the National Geographic Society to speak at his Applied Geography courses, such as Maynard Owen Williams, who recently returned from his Arctic expedition to describe its harsh environment and indigenous inhabitants adaptations.¹³¹

Despite each of these indications that Hildebrand was a more idiosyncratic figure than Graves—he once proudly declared that geography was the most “romantic” field within the curriculum of an university—he reliably continued his predecessor’s focus of interpreting the various climates, cultures, and races of the world through a filter of commercial opportunity.¹³² Out of any characteristic of the SFS curriculum, the Applied Geography course was to always make itself “as practical and as valuable as possible.”¹³³ Hildebrand’s midterm examination questions prove an unyielding dedication toward making the world a market for SFS students. Exam questions asked them to name elements that secured the successful sale of goods in a foreign country, geographic factors that made Africa a “backward continent” unfavorable to business investment, and the political status and principle products of the Hawaiian Islands.¹³⁴ No matter its precise circumstances, the firm conviction among most SFS administrators, faculty, and students that “the world is the American businessman’s market today” sits at the center

125 Ibid., 5-6.

126 Ibid., 5.

127 Graces, “Applied Geography: Syllabus,” in Thomas H. Healy, Academic Year 1924-1925 Syllabi of Courses, February 1925, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, SFS 1925 File, SFSB1, BFCSC, 55; and Eva Germaine Rimington Taylor, *The Business Man’s Geography: A Compendium of General and Post-War Conditions In Respect of Overseas Produce and Overseas Markets* (London, UK: George Philip & Son, 1926).

128 “J.R. Hildebrand Added to Teaching Staff,” *The Hoya* 7, no. 5 (October 15, 1925): 7.

129 Jessie Richardson Hildebrand, “The Geography of Games: How the Sports of Nations Form a Gazetteer of the Habits and Histories of Their People,” *The National Geographic Magazine* 36, no. 2 (August 1919): 89-152.

130 Hildebrand, “The Sources of Washington’s Charm,” *The National Geographic Magazine* 48, no. 6 (June 1923): 665.

131 “Explorer Makes Graphic Lecture: Member of the MacMillan Arctic Expedition Lectures Before Georgetown University School of Foreign Service—Class in Applied Geography is Great Success,” *The Hoya* 7, no. 7 (November 6, 1925): 7.

132 “J.R. Hildebrand Added to Teaching Staff,” *The Hoya* 7, no. 5 (October 15, 1925): 7.

133 Ibid.

134 Hildebrand, “Applied Geography,” January 26, 1926, 21-22 in Questions Used in Final and Supplemental Examinations, February 1926, School of Foreign Service, SFS 1926 File, SFSB1, BFCSC, 21-22.

of every other topic to be covered in this chapter: SFS graduate Willard L. Beaulac's complicity in U.S. military occupations, Edmund A. Walsh's shifting views on Russia and the "Slavic world," affiliations with banks responsible for coercive politics in the Caribbean, and Constantine E. McGuire's efforts to extract favors from Georgetown after he severed his formal ties.

Willard Beaulac, The "Boy Consul"

By the School of Foreign Service first graduation ceremony on June 14, 1921 (after completing the school's two-year curriculum), thirty-two out of the school's sixty-four graduating senior class had accepted employment opportunities at trade companies in the United States or foreign countries, six entered the U.S. diplomatic and consular services, and fifteen became trade commissioners for the Department of Commerce.¹³⁵ The graduation speaker of the university's general assembly, Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby, eagerly called upon students to assist America's reaching out to the world's markets in a fair and honorable manner. He shamefully admitted that large U.S. corporations who "cheat" foreign countries conjured suspicions abroad by selling subpar products, but the School of Foreign Service could ferment an honest reputation and greater trust between the United States and its trade partners.¹³⁶

Denby anticipated that the graduates before him would replicate his anecdote of "a very great market being conquered" by a single man deeply knowledgeable of a foreign consumer base.¹³⁷ A few years ago

in a South American country, American and British businessmen struggled to sell brightly-colored fabrics to a large indigenous population.¹³⁸ A German firm seeking to enter the potential market sent an archaeologist to the region, where he learned that the indigenous peoples considered the colors of the American and British goods unlucky. The German firm then removed those colors from their products and immediately secured the indigenous peoples' clothing consumption.¹³⁹ Similar to the lessons of Professor Graves' and Hildebrand's Applied Geography course a few years later, this story instructed SFS graduates to intimately study foreign lands, so that their denizens and cultures would become commensurable—and therefore profitable—to the world of the businessman.

Denby declared that future commercial conquests would rely on whether Americans advancing their nation's commercial interests come across to foreign countries as "good, clean, honest business men" or "cheap swindlers."¹⁴⁰ Ironically, one of the audience members would repeatedly embody far more coercive business practices than those endorsed in Denby's message—showing a disconnect between a benevolent value that the School of Foreign Service rhetorically promoted among its students, and the more underhanded reality of U.S. behavior overseas in spite of earnest intentions. This individual was Willard L. Beaulac, the first student to receive the School of Foreign Service's Bachelor of Foreign Service degree, an honor he attained due to the coincidence that his name was listed first alphabetically among his twenty-one-person graduating class.¹⁴¹ Despite its mundane rationale, this distinction granted him considerable recognition at Georgetown: photographs of Beaulac's degree were placed inside the school's

135 "School of Foreign Service," *GCJ* 49, no. 9 (June 1921): 488.

136 Edwin Denby, "Address to Graduates," *GCJ* 49, no. 9 (June 1921): 463.

137 *Ibid.*, 464. Most of the information of this story come from U.S. Secretary of Commerce William C. Redfield, who recounted a more detailed version than Denby's account in 1919. "Editorial: A National of Foreign Trade," *The New York Evening Mail*, August 23, 1919, 79–80 in *Yearbook, 1919–1920*, 80.

138 *Ibid.*, 464; "Editorial: A National School of Foreign Trade," 80.

139 *Ibid.*, 80.

140 *Ibid.*, 463.

141 Willard L. Beaulac, *Career Ambassador* (New York, NY: The MacMillan Company, 1951): 4; "Graduation Exercises: Class of 1921, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University," June 14, 1921, Commencement 1921 File, Commencement Files Box 4, BFCSC.

successive catalogues and Walsh even hung a copy in his office.¹⁴² The U.S. consular service immediately employed Beaulac and stationed him as the assistant vice-consul of the Tampico oil fields in Mexico.¹⁴³ The rugged frontier town preoccupied the young man with “plenty of excitement and plenty of fun” as his tasks reputably ranged from uncovering a white slave trafficking ring to accompanying a Mexican military detachment as it battled bandits raiding American petroleum companies.¹⁴⁴ Beaulac amusingly declared that, “If Hollywood were to portray faithfully some of the incidents and circumstances that were well known in Tampico, it would undoubtedly be charged with exaggeration.”¹⁴⁵ Across the next four decades, Beaulac would also become the first SFS alumni to make a name for himself in U.S. foreign service circles, eventually serving as the U.S. ambassador to Paraguay (1944–1947), Colombia (1947–1951), Cuba (1951–1953), Chile (1953–1956), and Argentina (1956–1960).¹⁴⁶

Before these ambassadorships, Beaulac contributed significantly to a series of U.S. military interventions across Latin America. The first was as the counsel general of Puerto Castilla, a recently constructed United Fruit Company Organization (UFCO) port nearby Trujillo, Honduras. Stationed in a “banana republic” politically and economically dependent on the UFCO and other foreign businesses, the consulate’s *raison d'être* was the smooth exportation of bananas and ensuring that Honduran politics did not disrupt

said exports.¹⁴⁷ Only twenty-four years old, Beaulac was reputably the youngest consul of the United States; a flattering newspaper profile from his hometown in Pawtucket, Rhode Island later dubbed him as the “Boy Consul.”¹⁴⁸ With the exception of his Catholic faith in a WASP-dominated field, Beaulac personified the American “banana cowboy” archetype associated with the UFCO in the Honduras: a college-educated, khaki-wearing, white-collar management type with authority over nonwhite agricultural laborers, typically wielding a pistol on his belt and a Stemson hat atop his head.¹⁴⁹ The U.S. Department of State flew Beaulac down to the Honduras in 1924 as it anticipated the country’s liberal and conservative political factions to fight a civil war.¹⁵⁰ Beaulac was to officially open and manage the consulate in case any outbreaks of violence imperiled American interests.¹⁵¹ Beaulac had blanket authority to request the presence of a U.S. naval warship and even deploy marines in defense of American lives and their property at Puerto Castilla or Trujillo.¹⁵² While Beaulac never ordered the landing of marines, he did request naval vessels on multiple occasions to safeguard American belongings when war did break out. In his 1951 biography *Career Ambassador*, published when flagrant foreign interventions were far more frowned up, Beaulac reflected with bewilderment that the State Department left a man of his age—only three years out of college—with the discretion to initiate military action against a sovereign nation.¹⁵³ In one

142 Beaulac, *Career Ambassador*, 4.

143 Ibid.

144 Ibid., 35–39.

145 Ibid., 85.

146 Joan Cook, “Willard Beaulac, 91, Ambassador to Five Latin American Nations,” *The New York Times*, August 28, 1990, <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/28/obituaries/willard-beaulac-91-ambassador-to-five-latin-american-nations.html>.

147 Beaulac, *Career Ambassador*, 40, 43.

148 “Willard Beaulac Consul in Haiti for Four Months: Pawtucket Man, Youngest Member of Service, Reveals Appointment,” *The Times*, 1927, Folder 17, Box 1, Willard Leon Beaulac Papers, BFCSC.

149 Beaulac, *Career Ambassador*, 50–57; James W. Martin, *Banana Cowboys: The United Fruit Company and the Culture of Corporate Colonialism* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2018): 9.

150 Beaulac, *Career Ambassador*, 46.

151 Ibid., 75.

152 Ibid.

153 Ibid., 75–79.

notable instance, Beaulac's request for a U.S. warship helped ensure both the peaceful transfer of Trujillo's control from government to revolutionary forces, and the guaranteed presence of the UFCO at the negotiating table alongside the two sides and foreign nations' representatives.¹⁵⁴

One of Beaulac's next jobs with the Department of State was as the third secretary at the Haitian embassy during its military occupation by the U.S. Marine Corps.¹⁵⁵ Beaulac developed warm and complimentary—albeit paternalistic—feelings for Haiti, “I know no other country that so quickly charms the visitor and foreign resident as Haiti does. It's tragic history, the courage and courtesy of its people, their simplicity and kindness, which are capable, on occasions, of turning into primitive savagery.”¹⁵⁶ While he opposed U.S. interventions in her “sister republics” on principle, he fundamentally concluded that the U.S. occupation of Haiti since 1915 was justified: first on the basis to prevent a German sphere of influence over the island, and second to stabilize the country's tumultuous political environment. Beaulac sang high praises for progress in economic, educational, and public health development, but the occupation's publicly unaccountable political system heavily concerned him. One of the most striking experiences were the weekly meetings he attended at the Haitian cabinet where American treaty officials would run “a kind of laboratory in government.”¹⁵⁷ The below passage best summarizes Beaulac's uneasiness with his complicity with this undemocratic system:

*Neither did we require that congressional elections, provided for in the new constitution, be held. The president was assisted in governing the country by a council of state which he himself appointed and which in turn elected the president. We upheld and participated in a dictatorship which, while benevolent, was as arbitrary as many another dictatorship which has existed in the republics to the south of us.*¹⁵⁸

Beaulac's ambiguous positions on military force resurfaced during his deployment as second secretary in Managua, Nicaragua, which stationed U.S. marines since 1912.¹⁵⁹ Arriving during a period of sharpening militarization in the country, Beaulac and other U.S. officials feared that the well-equipped Sandinista army opposing the Nicaraguan government and U.S. occupation could adopt a “revolutionary character” and throw the entire country into turmoil.¹⁶⁰ Beaulac repeatedly described himself as anti-interventionalist in his biography, feeling that the Nicaragua occupation was unjustified and that the country would stabilize quicker without it.¹⁶¹ Nowhere else at the time did an American presence in a foreign country invite so much international notoriety and criticism.¹⁶² Nonetheless, Beaulac “enjoyed the excitement of it all,” and diligently carried out his post's orders to facilitate the intervention toward its end.¹⁶³ In reflective comments on Haiti and Nicaragua, Beaulac later admitted that both interventions unintentionally contributed to violence by provoking armed anti-occupation resistance—the Cacos in Haiti and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua—even though the interventions framed themselves as nonpolitical, stabilization

154 Ibid., 81–84.

155 Ibid., 98. For background on the U.S. occupation of Haiti (1915–1934), see Mary A. Renda, *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915–1940* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004).

156 Ibid., 100.

157 Ibid., 102–103.

158 Ibid.

159 For background on the U.S. occupation of Nicaragua (1912–1930), see Michel Gobat, *Confronting the American Dream: Nicaragua under U.S. Imperial Rule* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005).

160 Ibid., 16, 242–243.

161 Beaulac, *Career Ambassador*, 115.

162 Ibid., 118.

163 Ibid., 115.

missions.¹⁶⁴

At certain points, Beaulac's reflections on the interventions resemble a confessional, occasionally bemoaning his assistance in establishing a dictatorship over the Haitian people. He was less despondent over the political regime in Nicaragua, but still vividly frustrated over U.S. officials' naïve belief that the Marine Guard's supervision of elections would stimulate democratization. In contradiction with the occupations' lofty pretensions of governance and infrastructural uplift, Beaulac concluded that they were unscientific violations of sovereignty undertaken with an inadequate state machinery. Direction of the interventions were delegated to State Department bureaucrats who—while intelligent and competent according to Beaulac—were not and could not be experts in the countries they oversaw; in fact, no one in the State Department would be capable of the massive administrative needs and expertise of an intervention. The department could direct the U.S. Navy and Marines toward minimalist military assistance, but anything more would entangle it into a foreign quagmire.¹⁶⁵

Even though Beaulac disapproved of the more authoritarian nature of the Haiti intervention, he surmised that the Nicaragua intervention was far more counterproductive for both Americans' and Nicaraguans' best interests. While the intervention ended an ongoing civil war in the country, more foreign lives and property perished following the Marine Guard's arrival. Nicaraguans also continued to die during the subsequent anti-American insurgency led by the revolutionary Augusto C. Sandino. Beaulac begrudgingly admitted that his negative assessment vindicated Sandino, whose actions included the targeted destruction of a precious American mine and the kidnapping of its manager.¹⁶⁶ Beaulac presumed that Sandino's audacious assault was an ultimatum to the United States, one

that showed the intervention's stated aims—to defend American property and personnel—were in fact provoked attacks, rendering the occupation meaningless and unjustifiable.¹⁶⁷ Only weeks after the marines finally left Nicaragua in 1933, Sandino laid down his arms and ended his rebellion; Beaulac personally witnessed Sandino's reception as a national hero in Managua. The fruitless eighteen-year venture also damaged wider U.S. relations with Central America; to Nicaragua's neighbors, the occupation was yet another arbitrary abuse of power by the "Colossus of the North."¹⁶⁸

In the last chapter of *Career Ambassador*, Beaulac gauges the United States' constant military interventions to its south as an "honest effort" to resolve the political issues in the Honduras, Haiti, Nicaragua, and other nations, "whose populations are politically immature, where poverty and ignorance retard democratic evolution."¹⁶⁹ Beaulac uncharitably viewed foreign opposition to U.S. interventionism as a living contradiction: those who relied upon the U.S. military as their only dependable form of protection against the region's myriad revolutions, coup d'états, and civil wars were aghast at the actual implementation of protection.¹⁷⁰ "Our well-intentioned interventions" possibly even improved the material wellbeing of the countries' inhabitants, but by boosting anti-American fears and suspicions across Latin America, Beaulac concluded they were counterproductive to advancing U.S. interests. Beaulac was glad to see that in the decades following his departure from Managua, the United States promoted Pan American treaties based upon the principle of non-interventionism and finally progressed toward a continental unity that fractured in the 1920s.¹⁷¹ However, in touch with the Cold War bipartisan consensus at the time, Beaulac warned of the existential threat posed to this unity through "international Communism in the service of Russian imperialism." Ironically, this crusade

164 Ibid., 120.

165 Ibid, 121-122.

166 Ibid, 123..

167 Ibid., 114-115.

168 Ibid., 123-124.

169 "Toward a Better World," 257-262 in Ibid., 258.

170 Ibid., 259.

171 Ibid.

against communism would rapidly restore a new round of U.S. interventionism in Latin America: covert U.S.-backed operations such as the overthrow of Guatemalan President Jacobo Árbenz (1954), the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba (1961), and the assassination of former U.S. ally and Dominican Republic President Rafael Trujillo (1961) all occurred within a decade after *Career Ambassador's* publication.¹⁷²

Across my archival research, there was no program and course at the School of Foreign Service that directly trained or prepared Beaulac for his participation in U.S. military occupations after his graduation in 1921. I also came across no internal documents or public speeches from Walsh, McGuire, MacElwee, and other leading SFS figures that explicitly backed the protection of overseas economic interests with armed force. Regardless, a continuous preoccupation with safeguarding U.S. commercial desires coursed throughout the School of Foreign Service's curriculum and mission as well as Beaulac's interventionist actions. This is a constant pattern across the first decade of the School of Foreign Service's existence: a predominant concern with educating young American men for the advancement of U.S. commercial interests alongside more tangential connections with the most blatant manifestations of overseas U.S. imperialism. These connections typically consisted of the actions practiced by SFS students, faculty members, or guest speakers invited for lectures. For example, a few early SFS graduates entered employment for companies notorious for their substantial power over countries reliant upon the export of raw materials. Shortly after Beaulac arrived at

Puerto Castilla, a second SFS graduate named Connie R. Herron joined him as a private employee for the UFCO.¹⁷³ The UFCO stationed Herron in Guatemala from 1925 to 1926, but little documentation exists of his actual actions there.¹⁷⁴ However, it is unlikely that Herron had as dramatic of an impact as Beaulac despite the UFCO's extensive influence over Guatemala's government. Herron arrived during a rare democratic interlude for Guatemala: an independent legislature, a nationalistic journalism environment, and a politically active labor force each pressured the UFCO's Guatemala branch into conceding several privileges attained from the prior dictatorships, such as exemptions from taxes and government regulations.¹⁷⁵

In 1928, William H. Cross, a masters SFS graduate, received a position from the Firestone Rubber Company based in Akron, Ohio.¹⁷⁶ Like Herron, there are few details about Cross's appointment, but Firebrand had a similar level of notoriety regarding its dominance in Liberia as the UFCO did throughout Central America in the 1920s. A few years before hiring Cross, Firestone secured a ninety-nine-year lease with the government of Liberia to grow rubber across one million acres of the country's territory.¹⁷⁷ This was the first step to developing what historian Gregg Mitman called Firestone's massive "plantation world" to reduce the United States' rubber dependence on British and Dutch colonies.¹⁷⁸ To meet high expected quotas of coagulum rubber, the average Liberian tappers often needed to perform exhausting physical labor over eight hours a day; to meet the maximum wage rate, they could be working as long as eleven-hours per day for over

172 See the chapters "Warding Off Global Ideologies, 1954," 133-147 and "Containing Revolution, 1959-1990," 148-171 in McPherson, *A Short History of U.S. Interventions*, 143-144, 149-153.

173 "Connie R. Herron Given Assignment," *The Hoya* 6, no. 11 (December 18, 1924): 1-2.

174 "Mr. Herron to Go to Guatemala," *The Hoya* 7, no. 8 (November 13, 1925): 10; "Delta Sigma Pi Frat Holds Spring Dinner," *The Hoya* 7, no. 28 (May 21, 1926): 10.

175 Paul J. Dosal, *Doing Business with the Dictators: A Political History of United Fruit in Guatemala, 1899-1944* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1993): 2-3.

176 "F.S. Men Secure Important Posts: Former Graduates of School Receive Prominent Appointments in Export Trade," *The Hoya* 9, no. 29 (May 24, 1928): 7.

177 Gregg Mitman, *Empire of Rubber: Firestone's Scramble for Land and Power in Liberia* (New York, NY: The New Press, 2013): 67.

178 *Ibid.*, xii-xiii.

twenty-six days of the month.¹⁷⁹ While Firestone coordinated this subordination of labor and the destruction of homes to secure its Liberian land holdings, ensuring a productive cultivation of rubber exports, the company decorated its intentions with claims of developing the country through access to American technology and capital, not a dissimilar line from Beaulac on Haiti.¹⁸⁰

Attention to the Slavic World

After Latin America, the region of the world to receive the most attention from SFS documents during the 1920s was Eastern Europe, often referred to as the so-called “Slavic world.” In a 1920 interior SFS document serving to “clarify our ideas of the economic importance of the Slavic people” Walsh explained the materialist rationale behind this focus.¹⁸¹ While most of the document surveys Eastern Europe using demographic, anthropological, and economic studies of its ethnic make-up, population distributions, and industrialization, it explicitly endorses the School of Foreign Service to direct its attention toward advancing “Slavic studies” so that the United States could benefit from the region’s massive populace and landmass.¹⁸² Walsh took an excerpt from a speaker at the American Manufacturers Export Association Convention he attended last year to stress Russia’s potential importance to U.S. economic interests.¹⁸³ Being a “metropolitan county,” the United States could no longer satisfy its economic needs and growth by only selling products within its

domestic market, rather “she must investigate all existing *colonial countries* in order to determine how and where she may best throw her export power.”¹⁸⁴ Disappointingly, few would be available for free export competition: the colonies of Africa and South Asia were “certainly reserved” for Britain, France, and Italy, leaving only South America, China, and Russia largely open for the United States. The speaker believed that out of these three regions, Russia would pose the fewest challenges to promoting future U.S. exporting dominance. Although the World War sharply reduced Germany’s influence in Latin America—the region’s third most important trading partner in the pre-war era after the United States and Great Britain—the speaker foresaw that Germany would desperately seek to reestablish her presence there.¹⁸⁵ Meanwhile, entrenched British and Japanese commercial interests in East Asia would unquestionably “meet the competition of America” with ample forces, experience, and established relations.¹⁸⁶ The speaker concluded that the United States would encounter a less vicious export rivalry in Russia.¹⁸⁷ While Walsh did not argue that the United States should embark on its own colonization projects in competition with Britain, France, Italy, or Japan, he certainly shared the viewpoint that the United States ought to seek out weaker regions where it could establish economic pre-eminence.

Walsh reiterated this degree of seriousness regarding “the Slavic problem” for U.S. trade relations at the Smithsonian Institute’s National Museum auditorium (now the National Museum of Natural History) in Washington, DC the next year.¹⁸⁸ Speaking in front

179 Ibid., 195.

180 Ibid., 140.

181 Edmund A. Walsh, SJ, “Insert 1.” 1920, Office of the Regent of the School, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC, 1-4.

182 Ibid.

183 Ibid., 3.

184 Emphasis in original document. Ibid.

185 Ibid.; Warren Schiff, “Review: German–Latin American Relations: The First Half of the Twentieth Century,” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 22, no. 1 (1980): 109–110.

186 “Insert 1.” 3.

187 Ibid.

188 Walsh, SJ, “Draft of remarks by the Regent,” January 14, 1921, Auditorium of the National Museum, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC, 1-10. Engineer John Hays Hammond and U.S. Assistant Secretary to the

of the entire student body at an event inaugurating the establishment of an SFS Institute of Slavic Studies, Walsh reminded them that the School of Foreign Service was created two years ago to train men as successful foreign representatives in government, business, or financial institutions. This required a firm education in the “languages of commerce,” not only the most common languages used in international trade, but also relatively rare languages that “did not seem to invite our active penetration” until recent years. More specifically, the School of Foreign Service had the obligation to intensively study “distinct racial groups and geographic units” relevant to conducting trade: first, as a matter of proximity to the United States, and second, as circumstances permitted.¹⁸⁹ Latin America represented the first category: Walsh boasted of the School’s thorough provision of courses on the “American Republics” and Spanish and Portuguese language training, while being regrettably unable to support research into surviving indigenous languages of the region so far. The “great nation of the Far East,” for whom Walsh stated the School of Foreign Service laid foundations of intensive study, also demanded the United States’ attention: the “endless resources” at the command of nations in Central, Eastern, and Southern Asia and Australasia made the potential for future advanced study almost limitless.¹⁹⁰

Yet Walsh reminded the students that despite the School of Foreign Service’s international scope and influence, its culture, business practices, and economic structure—as with all attributes of North American civilization—were essentially an extension of Western European civilization, albeit refracted through its particular circumstances of geography, race, and institutions. Walsh remarked that after a century and a quarter of concentrating on the dramatic internal growth and

development of the United States, the last few years sparked a rejuvenation in America’s recognition of its roots and ties across the Atlantic to the affairs of Europe. Boosting the economic health of the nation was core to this realization: American manufacturers acknowledged that foreign trade profoundly impacted the health of domestic trade, and financiers found that a healthy and stable credit system for the world was a pre-requisite to a sound credit system at home.¹⁹¹ The “inexorable course of trade requirements” thus brought the United States into near proximity to Europe, obliging the training of American men who are devoted to U.S. institutions and idealism and familiar with the aspirations, languages, natural resources, and trade potentials of the nations and racial groups of Europe.¹⁹²

Accordingly, Walsh declared that the School of Foreign Service must establish the intensive study of these European groups, foremost the Slavic world, followed by “Italy and the Italian races,” and then the countries of Central Europe, France, England, and Spain.¹⁹³ Walsh admitted to his students that this ordering is seemingly arranged opposite to relative importance to U.S. trade. However, rather than flatly dismiss Eastern Europe because Americans currently know little about it and have difficulty accessing the region, Walsh was confident of the possibilities it could offer the United States once trained SFS graduates opened it for American businessmen.¹⁹⁴ He paid high compliments to the Slavic world, especially the Russians, who hosted vast pockets of subterranean wealth and advanced the intellectual development of politics, economics, and literature. Pitching the unrecognized possibilities of the Slavs to the students, Walsh vaunted that on account of “the character of their national genius,” the Poles, Bohemians, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians each deserved the fullest

Navy Oscar Terry Crosby also delivered papers at this same special event titled, “Significance of the Slavic World in the Future Trade Relations of the United States for the School of Foreign Service.” McGuire, “Draft Letter to U.S. Ambassadors and Ministers to Rumania and all the others,” January 1921, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC.

189 Ibid, 1-2.

190 Ibid., 2-3.

191 Ibid, 3-4.

192 Ibid., 5.

193 Ibid., 6.

194 Ibid.

attention and knowledge from U.S. commercial experts and practitioners. Given that the warfare of the past five years had discouraged other foreign powers from prioritizing the Slavic world in their commercial ties, Walsh saw a unique opening for U.S. economic penetration in the region.¹⁹⁵

At his 1920 National Museum speech, Walsh was dismissive of turmoil across Russia and Eastern Europe since World War I and the Russian Civil War, guaranteeing that the Slavic nations will rise to their rightful prominence in the world within a few years, eager to establish the United States as a key trade partner.¹⁹⁶ Beyond the continuation of elementary and advanced language training in Russian, the School of Foreign Service would plan to teach courses on the Polish, Czech, and Slovakian languages, the histories of Russia's territorial expansion into Asia and foreign policy, and its importance to U.S. political and commercial concerns in the upcoming years.¹⁹⁷ However, Walsh's optimistic rhetoric on Eastern Europe would completely reverse in the upcoming years. As the head of the Vatican's Famie Relief Mission to Russia from 1922 to 1924, Walsh's position rapidly transformed from one stressing economic opportunity to warning of Bolshevism as an existential threat against the moral values and national security of the United States.¹⁹⁸

Walsh's exhaustive efforts in Russia to free Archbishop Jan Baptist Cieplak and twenty-two Catholic priests from imprisonment under the Bolsheviks' revolutionary government led him to adopt extremely negative views of the Soviet Union. One incident that especially offended Walsh's sensibilities was a public

exhibition in Moscow of Polish religious treasures taken by Soviet soldiers from Poland. These treasures were seized after Polish forces routed the Soviet Union during its failed attempt to spread communist revolution to Germany two years prior. Included among this sacrilegious "ridicule of holy things" were relics blessed by the seventeenth century Jesuit missionary and martyr Andrew Bobola. Although Walsh successfully negotiated for their transportation to the Vatican as long as the treasures did not cross Polish territory, he attested that "the Bolsheviks are the lowest type of humanity I can imagine" and remarked that orders from the Holy See to uphold usual diplomatic decorum with the Soviet leadership was "like casting the proverbial pearls before swine."¹⁹⁹

From 1924 onward after his return to the United States, Walsh became a significant U.S. Catholic anticommunist intellectual, with the unique status of having foreign affairs expertise by actually visiting revolutionary Russia.²⁰⁰ When Walsh spoke on Russia to student bodies, he no longer described it as a land of pristine commercial potential, but as country where catastrophe won over civilization.²⁰¹ His first major public contribution to this cause was the following year during his "Russia in Revolution" twelve-part lecture series. He again hosted these talks at the National Museum Auditorium on the causes, progress, and consequences of the Bolshevik Revolution as well as the passionate debate over whether the Soviet Union should "be admitted into the family of civilized nations on the basis of absolute equality."²⁰² Walsh's post-mission commentary was now far more skeptical of the Russia's economic

195 Ibid., 7–8.

196 Ibid., 8.

197 Ibid., 9; McGuire to Walsh, SJ, "Memorandum for Fr. Walsh," June 1, 1920, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC.

198 An accessible study of Walsh's time spent in Russia is the chapter, "'What Think Ye of Russia?': Walsh and Catholic Anticommunism in the 1920s," 23–61 in McNamara, *A Catholic Cold War*. According to McNamara, the most comprehensive account is Henry Hull, "The Holy See and Soviet Russia, 1918–1930: A Study in Full-Circle Diplomacy," Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown University, 1970.

199 Walsh, SJ to Creeden, SJ, "Extracts from a letter from Father Walsh," Fall, 1922, 1, B29FR MPA.

200 McNamara, *A Catholic Cold War*, 53.

201 "Delta Phi Epsilon Hears Rev. Edmund A. Walsh," *The Hoya* 6, no. 13 (January 15, 1925): 8.

202 Walsh, "Russia in Revolution—Lecture Series, February 13, 1925–May 15, 1925" Pamphlet, January 26, 1920, Folder 281 (Series: Manuscripts/Addresses), Box 4, EWP 2, BFCSC.

opportunity for U.S. commercial interests, instead describing the domestic affairs of the Soviet government as a total tyranny over the individual, property, and family, and its foreign affairs as a danger to America's democratic and constitutional principles.²⁰³ Walsh's Russia lectures attracted massive crowds that featured many high-profile Washington, DC politicians, bureaucrats, and intellectuals.²⁰⁴ Even U.S. Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, who was among these prominent attendees, heartedly complimented Walsh in a personal letter on his presentation about the fall of the Romanovs.²⁰⁵

Bankers at the School of Foreign Service

One SFS memorandum describes a 1920-1921 winter lecture series, "Fifteen Public Lectures Upon International Finance," for Dr. Guillermo A. Sherwell's Latin America course. Within the enclosed listing of lecturers is more evidence that the School of Foreign Service eagerly hosted those who participated in American domination over Latin America countries during the early twentieth century.²⁰⁶ The speaker assigned for January 26, 1921 was the John H. Allen, president of the American Foreign Banking Corporation.²⁰⁷ Allen's previous position was as vice president of the National City Bank of New York (NCBNY), a company key to

the School of Foreign Service's initial steps as a vocational institution. In the same month that Creeden formally enacted the plan for the School of Foreign Service, Roy S. MacElwee—then the Director of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce and future dean of the School of Foreign Service—released a bulletin advocating what a Washington, DC-based commercial school should look like.²⁰⁸ MacElwee held up programs for college students at the NCBNY as an exemplar for any university seeking to establish a foreign trade and shipping college.²⁰⁹ Upon its creation, the School of Foreign Service quickly furnished vocational ties with the NCBNY. Working scholarships with the bank were one of the first prizes offered to students by the School of Foreign Service. Over the summer, winners would move to New York City, where they would receive trainings on the theory and practice of international banking. After three years of summer training and corresponding university coursework, the SFS graduates would then accept employment into the NCBNY and their first assignments to a foreign post.²¹⁰ By 1929, the School of Foreign Service had supplied the bank with at least fifteen graduates, posted at offices around the world from Brazil to Hong Kong.²¹¹

During his vice-presidency, John H. Allen also took up a more infamous position as the manager of the National Bank of Haiti, shortly before the country's occupation of the United States. In his role, Allen knew that perceptions of Latin America as a land strewn with anarchic violence and foreign savagery practices harmed

203 "Fr. Walsh Concludes Lectures on Russia," *The Hoya* 8, no. 28 (May 21, 1926): 10.

204 "Regent Begins New F.S. Course: Lecture Series Opens at National Museum—Unprecedented Crowd Attends," *The Hoya* 7, no. 14 (January 22, 1926): 1.

205 Herbert C. Hoover to Walsh, SJ, March 5, 1925, Folder 17 (Correspondence/Individual Herbert Hoover), Box 2, EWP 1, BFCSC.

206 Constantine McGuire, "Memorandum for Father Walsh," November 30, 1920, 1-2, Constantine McGuire Papers, BFCSC.

207 Ibid., 2.

208 MacElwee, "Vocation Education for Foreign Trade and Shipping," *Federal Board for Vocational Education, Bulletin 24, Commercial Education Series* no., 2 (November 1918): 1-85, SFS 1918-1919 File, SFSB1, BFCSC.

209 Ibid., 232.

210 "Students to Compete for Trip Abroad: Money Prizes and Scholarships to be Awarded by School of Foreign Service," *The Hoya* 1, no. 5 (November 12, 1920): 2.

211 "Recent F.S. Grad Takes Post in Brazil: G. Howard Johnson Takes Position with National City Bank of New York," *The Hoya* 10, no. 25 (April 25, 1929): 19.

U.S. efforts to open the region for profitable trade.²¹² As of result, he attempted to disabuse U.S. bankers of the most extreme rumors about Haiti in a 1920 article published by the NCBNY's foreign trade journal *The Americas*: "the stories occasionally heard of recent-year cannibalism and of infant sacrifices are not founded on fact, nor are the stories of attacks upon foreigners."²¹³ Despite his refutation of the most vicious myths about Haiti, Allen heavily relied upon stereotypical perceptions of Black American as childish and indolent to justify the U.S. Marine occupation of Haiti since 1915, "Humorous incidents were of almost daily occurrences, and showed the naivete and also the restricted mentality of the people, which latter was plainly noticeable even among the more highly educated."²¹⁴ Allen firmly believed that Haiti had no better option but to accept some semblance of white rule.²¹⁵

Allen's lecture, "Public and Private Credit in Latin America"—as with all others from the series—was hosted at the familiar National Museum Auditorium venue.²¹⁶ While Allen's speech did not touch upon Haiti or any other occupation in Latin America, it still orientated perfectly within the market frameworks promoted at the School of Foreign Service. Allen backed the growth of a national merchant marine to transport goods between the United States and Latin America and left an overall positive assessment of region's credit conditions.²¹⁷ While Latin America was already a substantial U.S. trade partner, Allen felt there was massive potential to boost this economic relationship even

more. The School of Foreign Service was so impressed by Allen's address that it decided to redistribute it for DC intelligentsia consumption, eventually attaining publication in the Pan American Union's February 1921 Bulletin.²¹⁸

McGuire's Curious Concerns

Despite his displeasure with the School of Foreign Service's divergence from his initial vision, McGuire expressed tinges of indignation whenever he felt the reputation of the school was downplayed or slighted. In a February 2, 1923 letter to the now-retired Creeden, McGuire expressed his astonishment that the Chamber of Commerce President Julius H. Barnes wrote an article entitled, "Foreign Affairs Neglected Study," that made no reference to the School of Foreign Service's contributions to the field. He suggested that the dean of the School of Foreign Service could tactfully impress the school's character and pioneering scholarship onto Barnes, who in the future ought to "make more extensive reference to Georgetown than he has done."²¹⁹ John Hopkins University's 1924 announcement of a million dollar fund for a new Graduate Department of International Relations—twice the size of the School of Foreign Services—threw McGuire into an even greater panic. He wrote a memorandum for Dr. Sherwell, and

212 Peter James Hudson, "Dark finance: An unofficial history of Wall Street, American empire and the Caribbean, 1889–1925," Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 2007; Hudson, *Bankers and Empire: How Wall Street Colonized the Caribbean* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2017): 204–205.

213 Allen, "American Co-operation Assures a Better Era for Haiti," *The Americas* 6, no. 8 (May 1920): 8, quoted in Hudson, "Dark Finance," 170.

214 Ibid. 6, quoted in Hudson, "Dark Finance," 171–172.

215 Hudson, "The National City Bank of New York and Haiti, 1909–1922," *Radical History Review* no. 115 (Winter 2013): 104.

216 "School of Foreign Service," *GCJ* 49, no. 5 (February 1921): 252.

217 Allen, "Public and Private Credit in Latin America," 254–263.

218 McGuire to Walsh, SJ, February 3, 1921, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC; Allen, "Public and Private Credit in Latin America," *Bulletin of the Pan American Union*, 52, no. 2 (February 1921): 254–263.

219 McGuire to Creeden, SJ, February 2, 1923, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC.; The article McGuire discusses is Julius H. Barnes, "Foreign Affairs Neglected Study," *The New York Times*, January 21, 1923, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC.

urged him to inform President Notz and Regent Walsh that if Georgetown did not initiate McGuire's original plan for the School of Foreign Service submitted in June 1918, it would be relegated "to the second or third rank" of schools specializing in international affairs.²²⁰

Four years after his departure, McGuire was still upset that few developments arose toward the hemispherical Catholic unity he hoped for six years ago. On March 17, 1925, he wrote a letter to Georgetown President Charles W. Lyons—Creeden's successor—sharing his embarrassment that out of the twenty-two U.S. embassies, legations, or high commissionerships in Latin American, not one was held by a Catholic. "Is it any wonder that Latin Americans smile incredulously when we of our 20 million Catholics and out 110 Archbishops and Bishops? Why would they credit such strength when they never see a Catholic Minister or Consul General?"²²¹ The continual absence of a Catholic presence in U.S. foreign service likely compounded McGuire's disappointment that the School of Foreign Service was an undergraduate school; amidst rising standards in professionalism, SFS graduates would enter the diplomatic and consular services in less prestigious positions than those with the credentials of an advanced graduate level degree.²²² This was a frequent trait of McGuire's correspondences with important Georgetown University and School of Foreign Service figures; five years earlier, he wrote to Walsh that Leo Stanton Rowe, a Latin American affairs professor at Georgetown and the Director General of Pan American Union, wished to teach an advanced graduate level course intended for a masters or doctorate degree granting institution.²²³ Unfortunately for McGuire, his

ambitions for graduate studies in international affairs would remain mostly unfulfilled until after World War II when Hunter Guthrie, dean of Georgetown University's Graduate School, made that level of coursework a permanent fixture of Georgetown.²²⁴

McGuire contacted Lyons for another reason relevant to his general complaints on the standing of Catholics in U.S. diplomacy. Touting the skills and experience of Guillermo A. Sherwell, McGuire thanked the president for connecting Sherwell with the New York attorney Martin Conboy, an alumni of Georgetown Law School. McGuire intended Conboy to strongly bring up Sherwell's name to Senator James Wadsworth of New York, who would then officially recommend Sherwell to the vacant ministerial posting in Asunción, Paraguay.²²⁵ McGuire wished Lyon to remind Conboy that "if there is any one country in the wide world which should appeal to the Society of Jesus, it is Paraguay, with whose history the Society in inseparably associated," a reference to seventeenth century Santísima Trinidad del Paraná Mission, the largest Jesuit mission during the Spanish colonization of the Americas.²²⁶ Even if a Paraguay appointment could not follow through, McGuire believed that the ministerial position to Venezuela would also be suitable for his friend; the other Latin American vacancy in Uruguay would be too expensive for Sherwell's aspirations. McGuire suggested that the current U.S. minister to Venezuela, Willis C. Cook, "could be transferred—promoted, in fact,—to Montevideo, and Sherwell appointed in his place."²²⁷ Sherwell never ended up in any of the three positions, passing away only sixteen months later, but McGuire's correspondence with Lyon reveals an early

220 McGuire to Sherwell, "Memorandum for Sherwell," April 22, 1924, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC.

221 McGuire to Charles W. Lyons, SJ, March 17, 1925, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC.

222 Emily S. Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004): 191.

223 Constantine McGuire to Edmund A. Walsh, SJ, July 23, 1920, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC, 1-2.

224 Curran, *A History of Georgetown University*, Volume 2, 247.

225 McGuire to Lyons, March 17, 1925, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC.

226 Julia Sarreal, *The Guaraní and Their Missions: A Socioeconomic History* (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014): 1-4.

227 McGuire to Lyons, March 17, 1925, BFCSC.

and audacious, albeit failed, attempt to take advantage of the recent foreign service networks forged through Georgetown University.²²⁸

Nor was this the first time McGuire attempted to boost Catholic association across the Americas via his connections to Georgetown. A short time after McGuire first met Lyons at a dinner hosted by U.S. Navy Admiral William S. Benson, and two weeks before his letter on Sherwell, McGuire informed him on the unfortunate circumstances befalling the Jesuit Archbishop Luis Muñoz y Capurón of Guatemala.²²⁹ In 1922, Guatemalan President Jose Maria Orellana—who gained power in a 1921 UFCO-backed coup d'état—exiled the newly appointed Archbishop Muñoz based off of accusations of a clerical anti-government conspiracy. Church relations only worsened since, with the Guatemalan government banning nearly all religious orders in 1924.²³⁰ McGuire expressed total disgust toward both Muñoz's treatment and Secretary of State Charles Evan Hughes' recognition of the military government, even taking a bewildered conspiratorial tone on how “the nest of grafting murderers who have ruled the country since the Grand Master of the Masons was able to secure recognition from the Secretary of State of the United States” in contradiction of Hughes' professed piety on the inviolability of foreign constitutional governments.²³¹

McGuire wished to ensure that the injustices faced by Muñoz, “a zealous worker for the two million illiterates who comprise the bulk of the Indo-Latin population of Guatemala,” did not go unrecognized, so he suggested to Michel Curley, head of the Baltimore Archdiocese that oversaw the diocese of Washington,

DC, that Muñoz y Capurón be invited to deliver the address at the next Pan American Mass on Thanksgiving Day.²³² McGuire wished “that all necessary measures be taken to secure the utmost publicity for this discourse,” including a dispatch by mail to every Latin American capital for the publication of Muñoz's speech. McGuire asked Lyons if Muñoz could reside at Georgetown College for this event several months in advance, or, if Curley declines the invitation, at a bare minimum support Muñoz's living arrangements. He assured the president that the archbishop, currently living in El Paso, Texas, could better manage his problems with Guatemala in Washington, DC, “the center of control of northern Latin American affairs.”²³³ Cognizant of the scale of this favor, McGuire appealed to Lyons through his personal acquaintance with Tierney, Archbishop Curley, and National Catholic Welfare Council officers who could testify his dedication to serving the Catholic hierarchy.²³⁴

In his message, McGuire omitted Muñoz's less flattering characteristics, most of all that Muñoz held a far more oppositional and combative stance against anticlerical legislation than his two Guatemalan archbishop predecessors.²³⁵ In exile, Muñoz even proclaimed the existence of a state-sponsored conspiracy to destroy the Church in Guatemala. Narratives from the Vatican's representatives to Guatemala aligned far more with the accounts of the Guatemalan government than with Muñoz. Angered by his antagonistic behavior, Vatican officials blamed him and other belligerent clerics for violating the distinctions of the political and religious spheres. Their constant transgressions against secularist laws bought the harsh penalties upon themselves, which

228 Lawrence A. Wilkins, “Obituary: Guillermo A. Sherwell,” *Hispania* 9, no. 5 (1926): 306–308.

229 Constantine McGuire to Charles W. Lyons, SJ, March 5, 1925, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC, 2.

230 Ibid.; Bonar L. Hernández, “Reforming Catholicism: Papal Power in Guatemala during the 1920s and 1930s,” *The Americans* 71, no. 2 (2014): 259–260.

231 McGuire to Lyons, March 5, 1925, 1–2.

232 Ibid.

233 Ibid., 2.

234 Ibid., 1.

235 Bonar L. Hernández Sandoval, *Guatemala's Catholic Revolution: A History of Religious and Social Reform, 1920–1968* (University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, IN: 2019): 26–28.

ironically accelerated the deterioration of the Church's standing in Guatemala.²³⁶ It is very likely that Lyons did not wish to confront Vatican orthodoxy by hosting such a polarizing figure to an ceremony representative of Pan American cooperation. That relations between the United States and Guatemala only recently normalized, largely through Secretary Hughes' cautious plan to reform Guatemala's currency and standardize its finances, was another probable influence on Lyons' decision.²³⁷ If Muñoz were to issue a moral diatribe implicating the Vatican and the United States in Guatemala's military rule, he could heavily risk Georgetown's standing with authorities of both institutions. When Lyons returned a message to McGuire on March 11, he confessed a deep concern with the crisis in Guatemala and Archbishop Muñoz's misfortunes, but ultimately felt that inviting the archbishop to Georgetown just now would not be "wise or prudent." He promised to explain his reasoning to McGuire at a later meeting, and while the exact contents of this proposed conversation are unknown, Lyons very likely feared that hosting Muñoz could harm Georgetown's reputation in Pan American circles.²³⁸ News clippings of the Pan American Mass eight months report a rather mundane celebration, hardly the bombast promised by McGuire.²³⁹

3. CONTESTING VISIONS OF IMPERIALISM AND NATIONALISM, 1926-1929

T

HIS CHAPTER DELVES into a far less recognized element of the early School of Foreign Service in pre-existing historical scholarship. Dissenting affiliates with Georgetown University and the School of Foreign Service are recognized within published histories of the campus, but only comparably recent movements such as the student-organized protests against the Vietnam War and South African apartheid.²⁴⁰ Progressing through Georgetown's interactions with territorial empire in the Philippines and informal empire in Cuba and Nicaragua, this chapter ends with a novel look at the anti-imperialist SFS history professor John H. Latané as an early predecessor to later university reflections on how the United States ought to engage with the world. Unlike the Vietnam and apartheid protesters of decades later, Latané did not openly address any direct or indirect role that the School of Foreign Service or Georgetown University played in rationalizing shrewd materialist relations with weaker nations, but his example still demonstrates that public opinion at the early School of Foreign Service was far from monolithic.

236 Ibid., 30.

237 Donald L. Kemmerer and Bruce R. Dalgaard, "Inflation, Intrigue, and Monetary Reform in Guatemala, 1919-1926," *The Historian* 46, no. 1 (1983): 21, 33-35.

238 Lyons to McGuire, March 11, 1925, Constantine McGuire Folder, CMP, BFCSC.

239 "Pan-American Mass On Thanksgiving Day," *The Sun* [The Baltimore Sun], November 22, 1925, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

240 Curran, *A History of Georgetown University: The Rise to Prominence 1964-1989*, Volume, 3 volumes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010): 141-163, 260-262.

Territorial Empire: The Philippines

Amidst the United States' ascendancy to global power came numerous accusations of "imperialism," a term that many U.S. foreign policymakers regarded with special offense given their efforts to differentiate themselves from the empires of Europe.²⁴¹ The faculty and administrators at the School of Foreign Service were likewise averse against labeling the United States as an imperialist nation. In fact, the first question for a 1926 "Commercial Policies and Treaties" midterm examination asked students why the traditions and experiences of the United States make its people anti-imperialist—likely in reference to the United States' antagonisms toward European colonialism in the Western Hemisphere.²⁴² Internationalist liberals at the School of Foreign Service saw little inconsistency between criticism of European territorial conquests and advocacy for American economic domination, but this variant of American anti-imperialism often exceptionalized even the most blatant U.S. territorial expansion.²⁴³ The course midterm of "Far East as an Export Field" covered the United States' largest overseas colony, the Philippines, but asked students to describe how its aims and policies in the Philippines were distinctive from those of

European nations in their colonies.²⁴⁴ Pedagogy at the School of Foreign Service pondered little over the deep interconnections between the growing empires of the Old and New Worlds. In reality, American policymakers repeatedly looked to Great Britain as an example of governing foreign peoples at the turn of the century; the British poet Rudyard Kipling's infamous hymn "The White Man's Burden" explicitly celebrated the United States for taking up the Anglo-Saxon mantle of civilizing inferior races.²⁴⁵ Within the same "Far East as an Export Field" midterm, even the brutal counterinsurgency that the United States waged against Filipino guerrillas from 1899 to 1902 in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War—killing approximately 250,000 Filipino from violence, disease, or starvation—is euphemistically described as "the pacification of the Philippines."²⁴⁶

Georgetown University and the School of Foreign Service yielded more attention toward the Philippines than any other overseas colonial possession of the United States. The case for or against the Philippines' independence was an incredibly popular topic at Georgetown's debate club, appearing a total of six times between January 1920 and May 1929, more than any other single subject during that time period.²⁴⁷ The first of these in December 1920, "Resolved, That the

241 Emily S. Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003): 123.

242 "Commercial Politics and Treaties: Midyear Examination," January 26, 1926, 4 in Questions Used in Final and Supplemental Examinations, February 1926, School of Foreign Service, SFS 1926 File, SFSB1, BFCSC.

243 Salvatore, *Disciplinary Conquest*, 225; Ian Tyrrell and Jay Sexton, "Introduction," 1-20 in Tyrrell and Sexton, eds., *Empire's Twin U.S. Anti-imperialism from the Founding Era to the Age of Terrorism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015): 2.

244 Frank R. Eldridge, "Far East as Export Field," in Questions, 25.

245 Kramer, *The Blood of Empire: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006): 10-12.

246 *Ibid.*, 157.

247 The undergraduate-level Philodemic Society hosted this question in 1925 and 1928 with the pro-independence affirmative winning both times, and Georgetown Law students at the Gaston Debating Society debated it in 1923, 1925, and 1927 with affirmative victories each year except 1927. "Philodemic Society Conducts Debate," *The Hoya* 9, no. 25 (March 26, 1925): 2; "Philodemic Debates on Filipino Independence," *The Hoya* 9, no. 25 (April 26, 1928): 9; "Hunnicutt Wins Prize Debate, *The Hoya* 1, no. 9 (March 11, 1929): 3. Georgetown Law students at the Gaston Debating Society hosted debates on the same subject with the affirmative winning in 1923 and 1925 and the negative in 1927. "With the Debaters: Gaston," *The Hoya* 1, no. 9 (November 5, 1923): 7; "Edward L. Wright is Law Prize Debater," *The Hoya* 1, no. 9 (April 28, 1927): 2.

Philippine Islands should be granted independence within one year" was selected by the Philodemic Society—an undergraduate-level debate club—for the Merrick Debate, the university's most prestigious debate competition. However, the Philippines were not only the subject of abstract debate. Filipino students, most of whom either attended the School of Foreign Service or the Law School, were among the most prominent and numerable nonwhite presences on campus grounds. A few exemplary SFS Filipino students attained high academic recognition. The University of the Philippines appointed SFS graduate Mariano C. Lopez as a rural economics professor at the beginning of 1925, and the Netherland's Academy of International Law selected the still-matriculating SFS student Alfonso Donesa as the first student to represent the Philippines at an international student council centered on international peace at the Hague and Geneva.²⁴⁸ In 1923, Filipino students formally organized themselves into the "Philippine Georgetownians" society. First presided by Donesa, the Philippine Georgetownians took up a "conspicuous part in the activities of the University" by hosting annual luncheons and other social events.²⁴⁹ High ranking SFS and Philippine officials often attended these occasions, with the 1925 annual luncheon featuring Edmund A. Walsh as the guest of honor, as well as Thomas H. Healy, a judge with personal ties to the Philippines, and the Philippine Press Bureau Director Vicente Bunnan as additional guest speakers.

Even more noteworthy was the presence of Teodoro M. Kalaw, the executive secretary of the Philippine Commission of Independence, as the luncheon's fourth

invited speaker. A former officeholder in the Philippine Assembly and Cabinet, Kalaw attained a controversial reputation among American colonial authorities as an outspoken Filipino nationalist.²⁵⁰ In 1910, Dean C. Worcester, a staunch imperialist and the head of the Philippines' Interior Department, used colonial anti-libel laws to shut down Kalaw's pro-independence political magazine with a costly lawsuit. Worcester even sentenced Kalaw to prison in a decision legally backed by the U.S. Supreme Court.²⁵¹ Regardless, Kalaw still pushed for Filipino self-determination in his home nation and the United States. The same year of the Philippine Georgetownians banquet, where Kalaw "urged his compatriots to give their utmost for the Philippines," he published a sympathetic historical account of Filipino armed resistance to American colonization.²⁵²

Kalaw's depiction of the Philippine-American War in *The Philippines Revolution* was far less euphemistic than the beforementioned SFS midterm examination packet, making special note of atrocities committed by American troops against Filipino civilians. For instance, Kalaw reported that following the near-total annihilation of U.S. troops at Balangiga, U.S. Army officer Jacob H. Smith invaded with the retaliatory order to "kill and burn" anyone capable of bearing arms—even children over the age of ten—and eviscerate the region into a "howling wilderness."²⁵³ While historians have long disputed whether Smith was successful at actually executing his indiscriminate order, anti-imperialists rallied around the "Balingiga massacre" as yet another vicious abuse of American power overseas.²⁵⁴

Due to this fascinating array of differing

248 "Mariano C. Lopez, F.S. Receives Signal Deal: Young Filipino Appointed to Professorship of Rural Economics—Graduate in Foreign Service," *The Hoya* 6, no. 13 (January 15, 1925): 3; "Foreign Service Men Attend Council: Philippines Represented at the Hague in Student Council—Attends League of Nations at Geneva," *The Hoya* 7, no. 5 (October 15, 1925): 7.

249 "Filipino Students Elect Officers," *The Hoya* 7 no. 6 (October 22, 1925): 10.

250 "Philippine Students Have Annual Luncheon: Third Annual Luncheon of Philipino Georgetownians a Brilliant Success ~ Rev. Edmund A. Walsh, S. J., was Guest of Honor," *The Hoya* 7 no. 10 (December 4, 1925): 10.

251 Kramer, *The Blood of Empire*, 342.

252 "Philippine Students Have Annual Luncheon," *The Hoya*, 10; Teodoro M. Kalaw, *The Philippines Revolution* (Manila, Philippines: Manila Book Company, 1925).

253 Kalaw, *The Philippines Revolution*, 299.

254 David L. Fritz, "Before 'The Howling Wilderness': The Military Career of Jacob Heard Smith," *Military Affairs*, 43, no. 4 (1979): 186; and James O. Taylor, *The Massacre of Balangiga: Being an Authentic Account by Several*

viewpoints on the Philippines at Georgetown University and the School of Foreign Service, it is difficult to ascertain whether top administrators favored Philippine independence in the immediate future. The far more mainstream position in the United States on the islands was the gradual but indefinite policy of “eventual independence,” ensured under the Jones Act passed by Congressional Democrats and President Woodrow Wilson in 1916.²⁵⁵ On the other hand, Baltimore Archbishop James Gibbons and other members of the American Catholic Church’s upper hierarchy were among the strongest supporters for the maintenance of American control. Concern for Catholic missions in the Philippines, especially amidst fears of a potential invasion and anti-Christian persecution by Japan, was one of the Church’s core justifications for colonial retention.²⁵⁶ Similar to this article’s research on Georgetown’s ties with interwar U.S. occupations in Latin America, there were no official statements or memorandums that directly address the Philippines, but once again, campus speakers indirectly reveal foreign policy positions that administrators of Georgetown University and the School of Foreign Service at the very least condoned or promoted.

A minor example of this was Richard B. Schmitt’s 1929 address at Gaston Hall. A Jesuit from Loyola College in Baltimore, Schmitt described the hardships of converting the Islamic Moro population on the Philippine island of Mindanao to provoke financial contributions to the Jesuit missionary schools.²⁵⁷ The Schmitt invitation suggests some sympathy toward standard ecclesiastical defenses of U.S. colonialism, but an earlier SFS guest lecture by Manuel Roxas, the Speaker of the Philippine House of Representatives and an ardent supporter of independence, presents a far more nuanced position.²⁵⁸ The January 24, 1924 event began with Roxas sharing how the Philippines fared

so far under American supervision: its literacy rate had risen to nearly ninety percent and the legal system synthesized the best elements from Roman civil law, British common law, and Islamic Sharia. He ended with an emotional appeal to professed American principles that if the United States were to grant independence for his home nation, it would “rest the opinion of the world as to our real belief in democracy.” Georgetown President Creeden, the chair of the event, then introduced the events’ other speakers. First was Alfonso Donesa, who as president of the Philippine Georgetownians and representative of the university’s Filipino students, explained the society’s organization and aims to the rest of the student body. Next was Leo Stanton Rowe, who took special care to warn the audience against analogizing the Philippine cause for independence to the nineteenth century fight against slavery. In a rather glaring contrast to Roxas’ concluding message, he assured that the colonization of the Philippines was not a moral stain on the United States; in fact, Rowe confided that “the United States has never held other people in subjection.”²⁵⁹ Advocacy for Philippine independence was a common political opinion at the School of Foreign Service, yet as Rowe’s comments’ and school coursework demonstrate, the dual advocacy for independence and apologia for empire were by no means incompatible positions at interwar Georgetown.

Informal Empire: Cuba & Nicaragua

This seemingly contradictory understanding of U.S. territorial empire resembles how the School of Foreign Service approached American empire that did not require the direct annexation or governance of

of the Few Survivors (McCarn Printing Company, 1931).

255 Kramer, *The Blood of Empire*, 31.

256 *Ibid.*, 358–359.

257 “Non-Resident Sodality to Hear Fr. Schmitt: Will Speak on Philippine Islands -Reception to Take Place During Second Week in May,” *The Hoya* 10, no. 25 (April 25, 1929): 13.

258 “Roxas Speaks at F.S. School: Speaker at Philippine House of Representatives Addresses Students—Philippine Night Program Held,” *The Hoya* 5, no. 14 (January 24, 1924):

259 *Ibid.*

foreign lands. Returning to the 1926 midterm examinations, the pamphlet included questions on the more informal elements of preserving U.S. economic interests: for instance, students in “Export Sales” were asked to name four features that made Cuba an attractive market for American manufacturers.²⁶⁰ This coursework corresponded with special events also centering commercial concerns, such as a lecture on Cuban business conditions by the Cuban consul to the United States in the class, “Latin America as an Export Field.”²⁶¹ Here the School of Foreign Service again neglects the historical context that explains the United States’ hegemonic influence over peripheral partners such as Cuba during the early twentieth century. Over the course of the 1920s, the United States dominated Cuba’s production of sugar, the country’s most profitable commodity, with American businesses owning more than sixty percent of the sugar industry and ninety-five percent of its exports entering the United States.²⁶² Cuba avoided the annexations experienced by fellow ex-Spanish colonies Puerto Rico and the Philippines, but the island nation entered independence as a U.S. protectorate under several controlling impositions decreed by its northern neighbor. Under the 1901 Platt Amendment, the United States could unilaterally intervene in Cuba using several justifications, including barring Cuba from going into debt or from making similar treaties with other nations.²⁶³ Cuban dissidents such as Fernando Ortiz Fernández long accused this deeply unequal relationship represented by the sugar industry and Platt Amendment of fomenting a foreign plutocracy over Cuba’s potential for democratic governance and economic sovereignty:

“Cuba will never be really independent until it can free itself from the coils of the serpent of colonial economy that fattens on its soil but strangles its inhabitants and winds itself about the palm tree of our republican coat of arms, converting it into the sign of the Yankee dollar.”²⁶⁴

A defense of the Platt Amendment was a core argument from one of the earliest dissertations completed at the School of Foreign Service. Porfirio A. Bonet, the Cuban consul general in Canada, became the first diplomat to attain a Doctorate in Foreign Service from the School of Foreign Service in 1925.²⁶⁵ Before his posting in Canada, Bonet was the Cuban commercial attaché to the United States—the diplomatic position that oversees economic affairs between the two countries—and a Cuba representative to the Pan-American Commercial and Financial Conferences. He also previously received a Masters of Foreign Service from Georgetown in 1923.²⁶⁶ Completed across two years of research, Bonet’s dissertation fundamentally interpreted the Platt Amendment as a mutually beneficial security pact between the United States and Cuba in which “the United States government guarantees to protect against all comers the independence and sovereignty of Cuba,” downplaying how this relationship directly curtailed Cuba’s sovereignty in the first place with the threat of military force. The Hoya’s profile of Bonet’s accomplishment also reminded readers of Cuba’s key importance to U.S. economic concerns, being among its most significant trade partners and “one of the wealthiest strips of territory in the world.”²⁶⁷ Apologists for these relations with weaker Latin American countries under coercive conditions were not a rarity at

260 Daniel E. Casey, “Export Sales Practice Supplemental Examination,” March 1926, 15 in Questions Used in Final and Supplemental Examinations, BFCSC.

261 “Consul to Speak on Pan American Trade: Señor Cayetano de Quesada to Address Foreign Service Class On Business Conditions Cuba,” *The Hoya* 7 no. 15 (February 5, 1926): 10.

262 Hugh Thomas, *Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom* (New York, NY: Harper & Row Publishers, 1971): 557.

263 “Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Cuba Embodying the Provisions Defining Their Future Relations as Contained in the Act of Congress Approved March 2, 1901,” 1-3, National Archives Catalog.

264 Fernando Ortiz Fernández, *Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995/1940): 94.

265 “Hon. Porfirio Bonet Awarded Ph.D in F.S.,” *The Hoya* 7, no. 8 (November 13, 1925): 10.

266 “Bonet Named as Cuban Consul General,” *The Hoya* 5, no. 5 (November 1, 1923): 3.

267 “Hon. Porfirio Bonet Awarded Ph.D in F.S.,” BFCSC, 10.

the School of Foreign Service.

Dana G. Munro, the first professor on Latin American affairs hired for the School of Foreign Service's faculty in 1919, was possibly the university's most ardent early proponent for U.S. foreign interventions.²⁶⁸ The year before his employment, he published *The Five Republics of Central America: Their Political and Economic Development and their Relations with the United States*, the culmination of four years of research funded by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace with the intention of fostering stronger U.S.-Latin American ties.²⁶⁹ Munro felt that despite prevalent American understandings of Central American as a dysfunctional land inherently unfit for self-governance, the region held much promise for the United States.²⁷⁰ However, this was also under the condition "the preservation of internal and international peace in the Isthmus has been powerfully aided by the influence of the United States."²⁷¹ He also stated that a lack of enforced religious conventions bred a low standard of societal morality prone to sexual infidelity.²⁷²

Present at the Nicaragua intervention before Willard L. Beaulac, Munro was more explicitly defensive of its occupation in practical terms. He found anti-imperialist charges that the U.S. government intervened to exploit the Nicaraguan people for American businessmen as "simply ridiculous." Munro did note that the foreign collection of Nicaraguan public revenues and the sale of its most valuable national properties under occupation—while absolutely necessary for economic stabilization—humiliated the "patriotic Nicaraguan citizen." The Nicaraguan party officials who most cooperated with American-led banking and

currency reform disproportionately profited from these changes, rather than the country as a whole.²⁷³ He was further disappointed that the Americans appointed within the various reform commissions received far higher remunerations than their Nicaraguan equivalents. Nonetheless, Munro was confident that these outrages were insignificant to the various long-run financial benefits of adjusting Nicaragua's foreign debt, improving its railroad transportation and customs systems, and establishing a stable currency system. Moreover, he declared that U.S. financial and military support was entirely responsible for maintaining order in Nicaragua, ensuring that "the vast majority of people have been inestimably better off" who would otherwise be locked in "bloody party strife and the wars with Central American neighbors."²⁷⁴

Despite these benefits, and like Beaulac's later conclusions, Munro believed that there was a fundamental moral wrong at the heart of the U.S. occupation, and that it could not remain as a permanent and sustainable trait of U.S.-Nicaraguan relations. The United States' support for a minority-led government and financial policies unpopular with much of the population in Nicaragua prompted fervent antagonisms across Latin America.²⁷⁵ Although Munro believed that the crisis worsened wider relations with Latin America, he was frustrated that Nicaragua and its neighboring countries did not sympathize with the United States for forcibly putting down a threat to its property and people.²⁷⁶

Comments as vehemently critical as Ortiz's rarely entered the classrooms of Georgetown University, but let it not be mistaken that all persons affiliated

268 "Foreign Service Notes," *The Hoya* 10, no. 12 (December 13, 1928): 7.

269 William R. Manning, "Book Review: *The Five Republics of Central America: Their political and economic development and their relations with the United States. By Munro, Dana G.*," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 1, no. 4 (1918): 441.

270 Dana G. Munro, *The Five Republics of Central America: Their Political and Economic Development and Their Relations with the United States*. New York University, NY: Oxford University Press, 1918): xiii.

271 *Ibid.*, xiv.

272 *Ibid.*, 12-13.

273 *Ibid.*, 262-263.

274 *Ibid.*, 264.

275 *Ibid.*

276 Manning, "Book Review," 443.

with Georgetown University or the School of Foreign Service backed U.S. actions abroad as eagerly as Munro. U.S. interventions in neighboring countries in the Caribbean and Latin America were one of the most contentious debate topics at Georgetown on the role of the United States in the world. As mentioned earlier, Beaulac and Munro doubted their basis even as they participated in them. Out of any of the midterms from the before-mentioned 1926 examination packet, the “Inter-American Problems” course taught by Leo Stanton Rowe, one of Munro’s successors, assigned the most open-ended questions on the United States’ behavior with its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere.²⁷⁷ Rowe’s prior employment in Puerto Rico’s colonial administration and his defense for the American treatment of the Philippines presumably indicate an interventionist attitude toward Latin America that would resemble that of Munro.²⁷⁸ However, his appointment as director general of the Pan American Union in 1920 would actually herald a less aggressive expression of U.S.–Latin America relations.²⁷⁹ Heavily involved in the resolutions of the U.S. occupation in Haiti and disputes with Mexico following its revolution, Rowe was at the forefront of reconciliating Latin American hostilities toward the “Colossus of the North.” Argentinian historian Ricardo Salvatore recognizes Rowe’s softer endorsement of inter-American cultural and intellectual connections as a precedent for the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration’s reproachment strategy a decade later under the Good Neighbor Policy.²⁸⁰ Rows’ background thus prompted the development a far more multidimensional picture of U.S.–Latin American relations beyond how American commerce could benefit

from the region’s industry and trade, topics overwhelmingly prioritized in other classes such as “Export Sales,” “Latin America as an Export Field,” and “Staple Commodities of World Trade.”²⁸¹

Unlike the previous midterm examples on the Philippines and Cuba, Rowe’s course did not omit negative attitudes toward the U.S. presence in Latin America, but neither did he unequivocally denounce it as an imperialist violation of foreign countries’ sovereignties. He expected students to explain how Latin Americans evolved their own attitudes toward the United States’ involvement in the region. He urged that Latin America was not simply a bounty of raw resources and trade opportunity to make Americans rich. Rowe left deliberately ambiguous questions for SFS undergraduates in his examination; students had to present and justify their own views on foreign policies as controversial as the military occupations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic.²⁸²

While self-described “anti-imperialists” in the United States first emerged in opposition to U.S. annexations of overseas territories during the turn of the century, most notably during the debates over the acquisition of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and the Panama Canal Zone, anti-imperialists discourses rallied more around the economic attributes of U.S. foreign policy by the 1920s.²⁸³ The anti-imperialist movement was ideologically diverse, including socialists opposed to U.S. hegemony in Latin America, Black newspapers lambasting unfair investment deals in Haiti and Liberia, and more moderate commentators who supported the growth of U.S. commerce but criticized its more militant attributes.²⁸⁴

277 Leo Stanton Rowe, “Inter-American Problems: Midyear Examination,” January 26, 1926, 21 in *Ibid.*

278 Salvatore, *Disciplinary Conquest*, 48.

279 *Ibid.*, 49.

280 *Ibid.*

281 Bryan K. Ogden, “Latin America as an Export Field: Midyear Examination,” January 28, 1926, 30; Bryan K. Ogden, “Latin America as an Export Field: Supplemental Examination,” March 1926,” 31; and Spillman and Read, “Staple Commodities of World Trade: Midyear Examination,” January 28, 1926, 44–46 in *Questions Used in Final and Supplemental Examinations*, BFCSC.

282 Rowe, “Inter-American Problems,” 25 in *Ibid.*

283 E. Berkley Thomas, *Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890-1920* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970); Rosenberg, 123.

284 Rosenburg, *Financial Missionaries to the World*, 123–135.

As with most subjects of political controversy, the question of the United States' role in the world entered open discussion at Georgetown. The university's rich array of debate societies frequently took on arguments over the recognition of the Soviet Union, the expansion of merchant marine and naval fleets, the League of Nations, and the Kellogg–Briand Pact.²⁸⁵ One repeated topic was the U.S. military protection of American investments abroad, such as a Georgetown Law School debate in May 1929 on whether the United States should continue its occupation of Nicaragua.²⁸⁶ Previously, the Philodemic Society—the university's most prestigious undergraduate debate club—also selected, "Resolved, That the United States Government Should Withdraw the Troops from Nicaragua," with the affirmative even winning the debate.²⁸⁷

One of the most outspoken critics of U.S. foreign policy associated with the School of Foreign Service was John Holladay Latané, a professor of American diplomatic history who also chaired John Hopkins University's history department.²⁸⁸ A prolific writer on subjects ranging across colonial America, the Civil War, Reconstruction, and contemporary foreign affairs, Latané agreed with most SFS affiliates that the end of World War I bore unforeseen global opportunities for the United States, writing in the preface to his book, *From Isolation to Leadership, Revised: A Review of American Foreign Policy*, that "sooner or later we must

recognize and assume the responsibilities of our position as a great world power."²⁸⁹ Latané proudly attributed the Monroe Doctrine—a centuries-long U.S. foreign policy opposed to European intervention in the Western Hemisphere—with preventing the re-colonization of the Americas while most of Africa and southern Asia fell under colonial rule. However, he also acknowledged that many Latin Americans understandably did not share these positive sentiments.²⁹⁰

A month before the SFS Tenth Anniversary Commemoration of 1929, which invited advocates for the legal abolition of war, U.S. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, Latané was a guest speaker to the Fourth Conference on the Cause and Cure of War hosted in Washington, DC. Condemning the incongruity between the cooperative anti-war ambitions of the Kellogg–Briand Pact and the predatory behavior of the United States in the Caribbean and Latin America, Latané declared that the Senate's consideration of a naval cruiser construction bill was a nullification of its earlier ratification of the pact. Articulating a materialist interpretation of the U.S. foreign policy, Latané told the conference that only the size of U.S. overseas investments, not promises from peace treaties or agreements, determined the scale of its naval construction.²⁹¹

Latané's views directly contradicted Kellogg's more optimistic assumptions made at Georgetown a month later that his treaty indicated a substantial

285 "Soviet Recognition Is Yale-G.U. Question," *The Hoya* 3, no. 19 (March 9, 1922): 7; "White," *The Hoya* 5, no. 21 (March 13, 1924): 2; "D.J. McCune wins Hamilton Medal," *The Hoya* 5, no. 30 (May 22, 1924): 1; "White Prepares for Loyola Debate," *The Hoya* 10, no. 20 (March 7, 1929): 1; "With the Debaters: Philodemic," *The Hoya* 4, no. 10 (December 7, 1922): 5; "Cavanaugh Again Heads Philodemic," *The Hoya* 10, no. 16 (February 7, 1929): 1; "With the Debaters: Philodemic," *The Hoya* 4, no. 10 (December 7, 1922): 5; "Cavanaugh Again Heads Philodemic," *The Hoya* 10, no. 16 (February 7, 1929): 1; "New York University Debaters Are Defeated by Georgetown," *The Hoya* 9, no. 20 (March 8, 1928): 1.

286 "Nicaragua Made Debate Subject: Representatives of Four Law Clubs Will Meet at Georgetown Wednesday," *Washington Post*, May 1929, SFS 1929 File, SFSB1, BFCSC.

287 "Philodemic Debates Nicaraguan Question: Seven New Members Admitted—Debate on Central American Invasion," *The Hoya* 10, no. 6 (October 27, 1928): 17.

288 Curran, *The Quest for Excellence*, 92

289 John H. Latané, *From Isolation to Leadership, Revised: A Review of American Foreign Policy* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1922): i.

290 *Ibid.*, 3.

291 "Large Navy Plan Hit at Conference: Dr. Latane Assails Cruiser Consideration With Passage of Kellogg Pact," *Washington Post*, January 17, 1929, SFS 1929 File, SFSB1, BFCSC.

nonbelligerent change in how nations conducted themselves with one another.²⁹² In contrast, Latané maintained that the “economic imperialism” of the U.S. dollar diplomacy, specifically the creation of protectorates in the West Indies and coercive relations with Latin American republics favorable to U.S. interests, undermined pretensions toward international peace: “We have presented to the world a treaty renouncing war as an instrument of policy, but navies are instruments of imperialism and they are used to safeguard investment.”²⁹³ A *Washington Post* article reporting on the conference summarizes Latané’s attitude with the pithy statement, “The Constitution may not follow the flag, but the State Department follows the dollar.” To Latané, the “big Navy advocates” regarded the Kellogg pact with mockery as a “harmless and meaningless declaration against war,” ultimately irrelevant to the provision of cruisers guaranteed to safeguard their foreign investments. Latané’s denouncement of the paradoxical political entanglement between the U.S. renouncement of war and the growth of its navy demonstrates a counterhegemonic SFS viewpoint on how the U.S. impact on foreign countries, one far incredulous than the sentiments of high ranking Georgetown administrators or SFS-hosted commemorations.²⁹⁴

For example, Latané stated massive figures on U.S. overseas economic activity at the conference: a twenty-five-year increase in Latin American investments from \$300 million to over \$5 billion, an observation that marked similar trends as Assistant Dean Healy’s articles published nationwide later that year.²⁹⁵ The latter boasted of the school’s mission to fulfill America’s new expectations as a major global player in public newspapers. In one June 2, 1929 *Washington Post* contribution, Healy urged that “our vast economic, financial, and political interests abroad, running

into stupendous proportions” needed a field of men satisfactorily trained in export and import trade, international shipping, international banking, international law and foreign relations, diplomacy, consular service, or trade commissioner service. Recounting that the United States obtained by that point an import-export trade of almost \$10 billion, abroad private investments of \$13 billion, and government obligations of \$11 billion, Healy was deeply aware that no few countries had ever attained the level of economic and financial strength that the United States accumulated over the past multiple decades, nor had as much potential to secure even more future prosperity from its advantageous position.²⁹⁶

However, the moral and political interpretations of these two SFS affiliates were diametrically opposed. For Healy, the postwar commercial and investment growth advanced opportunity and responsibility for the United States abroad, a towering new role in which the School of Foreign Service eagerly supplied the manpower for its nation to wield and advance.²⁹⁷ The spirit of civic nationalism courses throughout Healy’s promotion of the School of Foreign Service’s attributes and feats as an auxiliary institution to the United States’ foreign interests. In comparison, Latané’s speech exhibits the darker, hierarchical underbelly of this historical development. Latané began his analysis with the aftermath of the Spanish–American War, and rather than celebrate the conflict as a harbinger of the United States’ global emergence (as Nevils did in his correspondence with Creeden) or even as an anti-imperialist victory against an archaic and brutish Spanish empire, Latané scrutinizes the annexation of the former Spanish colony Puerto Rico into its territory. Latané then noted that while the United States has not annexed any independent states and was unlikely to enact such

292 “Pact No ‘Gesture’: Kellogg Declares,” February 19, 1929.

293 “Large Navy Plan Hit at Conference,” January 17, 1929.

294 *Ibid.*

295 *Ibid.*; Healy, “Service in Foreign Countries Urged,” *The Washington Post*, June 2, 1929, SFS 1929 File, SFSB1, BFCSC; Healy, “Training for the Foreign Service Profession,” *The Indiana Catholic and Record*, June 12, 1929, SFS 1929 File, SFSB1, BFCSC.

296 *Ibid.*

297 Healy, “Service in Foreign Countries Urged,” June 2, 1929; Healy, “Training for the Foreign Service Profession,” June 12, 1929.

a method of direct control in the future, he asserts that economic imperialism does not need to rely on “crude” measures such as annexation to maintain dominance. Rather, the State Department propped up “puppets” as leadership in select countries such as Nicaragua.²⁹⁸

To counteract the State Department’s abusive relations with its southern neighbors, Latané declared that the U.S. government needed to rein in the behavior of American investors: specifically, that all contracts between American citizens and foreign governments must contain an arbitration clause to settle disputes between the two parties. Presumably, this would avoid American investors’ repeated demands that the United States should militarily intervene if foreign business deals go awry, as was historically the case in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.²⁹⁹ While unrepentant in his cynicism toward U.S. imperialism, Latané foresaw some potential for better relations toward Latin America with the signing of the General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration on January 5, 1929. He hoped that president-elect Herbert Hoover’s visit to South America was another sign of less confrontational diplomatic attitudes; a move toward commerce that would cultivate good will with smaller nations rather than the business frictions that led to the intervention of U.S. marines in Caribbean and Central American states.³⁰⁰

While Latané did not directly comment at the conference on what role—if at all—the School of Foreign Service or his employment at the school played within the economic imperialism he deplored, his speech unveiled an oppositional worldview of U.S. foreign policy largely neglected on Georgetown’s campus. The significant ruptures between the political beliefs of Kellogg, Healy, and Latané invite a contrast to Norwegian historian Odd Arne Westad’s thesis on U.S. and Soviet foreign policymakers during the Cold War. According to Westad, each group was often sincere in their universalist competing beliefs: free markets

and relative skepticism against a powerful state for the United States, centralized production and transition to socialism for the Soviet Union, and technological progress for both.³⁰¹ Westad contests the assertion that these ideologies were purely cynical justifications of geopolitical power plays; in fact, policymakers’ passionate ideological attachments partly explained why interventions in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and elsewhere reached their levels of violent brutality.³⁰² In a similar fashion, the self-interested motivations during the early formation of the School of Foreign Service do not simply expose Walsh, Healy, and others’ principles as ideological veneers. Their trust in liberal internationalism or peace through international commerce was genuine although SFS officials either downplayed or ignored the negative effects of U.S. hegemonic emergence onto foreign countries.

298 “Large Navy Plan Hit at Conference,” January 17, 1929.

299 Hudson, Bankers and Empire, 101, 115, 157–158.

300 “Large Navy Plan Hit at Conference,” January 17, 1929.

301 Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012); 5, 9, 39, 72.

302 *Ibid.*, 5.

CONCLUSION

The Tragedy of the School of Foreign Service & Where to Go from Here

THIS ARTICLE IS intended to instigate future scholarly contributions, a call not unlike Hugh Gusterson's presidential address at the 2017 American Ethnological Society where—inspired by Cold War era interrogations of collaboration between state, military, and university apparatuses—he urged anthropologists to self-reflectively study the more recent restructuring of the university into a neoliberal entrepreneurial model.³⁰³ In particular, this article is intended to inspire two paths of future historical scholarship. The first is orientated to a national or university-specific scale. Comparatively little literature exists on ties between U.S. higher education and U.S. foreign policy before the Cold War, other than World War I and World War II. The second narrows its aim at histories of Georgetown University and the School of Foreign Service themselves.

The Cold War could potentially host the most plentiful and case-specific scholarship on Georgetown University. The superpower archrivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union witnessed Georgetown's restructuring into the leading international relations university it is known for today.³⁰⁴ This first occurred through the development of an unprecedented level of state–military collaboration, and second

with massive reforms in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s initiated by SFS Dean Krogh transformative enough to deem him the school's "second founder" after Edmund A. Walsh.³⁰⁵ Georgetown's graduate departments especially experienced unprecedented levels of financial and government support for defense-related research and training.³⁰⁶ The most fantastical example of this development was Georgetown's inauguration in 1951 as the 352nd Military Government Area Reserve Unit, the only type-A military headquarters status granted to a university in the country. Under this role, Georgetown would train officers to lead military-occupied governments in the Eastern Bloc foreseeing "M-day," a full-scale invasion of the Soviet Union.³⁰⁷

It is important to note that the School of Foreign Service's founders were not shrewd materialists who advanced U.S. economic growth at the cost of any concerns from foreign countries. They held up earnest assumptions that commercial expansion developed world peace while also—depending on the individual—rationalizing or challenging the more forceful policies directed toward this goal. In this sense, the School of Foreign Service shares much in common with William Appleman Williams' thesis in *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, arguably the most well-known book in U.S. diplomatic history scholarship. The "tragedy" in William's title refers to how the assumptions of U.S. policy-makers ideologically entrapped themselves.³⁰⁸ Through rigid frameworks such as commercial expansionism or anticommunism, policymakers backed decisions grossly disconnected from their professed aims of international peace and stability, often resulting in military or economic coercion against weaker nations that further

303 Hugh Gusterson, "Homework: Toward a Critical Ethnography of the University," *American Ethnologist* 44, no. 3 (2017): 435.

304 See Westad, *The Global Cold War* for a nuanced study of the forty-five-year standoff. See footnote 21 for notable scholarship on Cold War universities as well as Gusterson, "Homework," 437–439.

305 Ogden, "Inside the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service," 14. Georgetown's Cold War history is documented across Curran, *The Quest for Excellence*, 233–391; Curran, *A History of Georgetown University: The Rise to Prominence 1964–1989*, Volume 3, 3 volumes (Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010): 1–29, 88–163, 199–264; Tillman, *Georgetown's School of Foreign Service*, 29–82; and Georgetown University, SFS 100, 104–123.

306 Curran, *The Quest for Excellence*, 288.

307 Ibid., 380.

308 Lloyd Gardner, "Foreword," 6–14 in William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York City, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009/1962): 9.

damaged relations with the United States.³⁰⁹ Edmund A. Walsh, who the School of Foreign Service honorably named itself after in 1958, exemplified this tendency in its most extreme variant through his vehement anti-communism and framing of the Soviet Union as an ontologically evil barbarism.

Alongside taking the preliminary steps toward establishing Georgetown University as a military government reserve unit, and supporting President Harry S. Truman's 1945 proposal that all eighteen-year-old American males undergo peacetime military training, Walsh's most notorious action during the Cold War was his argument in favor of a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union.³¹⁰ First proposed in various interviews, lectures, and articles, and then expanded upon in the chapter "Atom Bombs and the Christian Conscience" of his 1951 book *Total Empire: The Roots and Progress of World Communism*, Walsh argued that America leaders were morally obligated to a commit a first strike on the Soviet Union if war appeared imminent, being "a power with no moral inhibitions."³¹¹ What makes Walsh a "tragic" figure (both in how Williams uses the term and in a more dramatic Shakespearean flair of *hamartia*) is that his ideological, even theological, belief in the Soviet Union's inherent immorality led him rationalize any civilian deaths as little more than a "regrettable effect" negligible to the "cosmic poker game for the highest stakes in history."³¹² Three decades earlier, Walsh's famine relief efforts possibly saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of Russians from starvation, only for him to justify the hypothetical annihilation of tens of millions in a nuclear apocalypse as a necessary evil in order to halt the inexorable march of World Communism.³¹³ Given that his mission operated out of Moscow, many of those very same survivors

would have perished in the assault Walsh proposed.

The overseas experiences of the very first SFS graduate alone poses an outstanding irony to the School of Foreign Service's public image. The preface of *SFS 100: A Century of Service* states that the "SFS was established to send its graduates overseas to make the world a better, safer, more prosperous place," a sentiment dispersed across SFS Centennial events.³¹⁴ Yet Beaulac's story directly contradicts this message: he admitted that U.S. overseas interventions often contributed to the exact opposite. This article thus calls upon more scrutiny on the School of Foreign Service as an historical institution; indeed, "imperialist" would be an apt descriptor of the school in the 1920s due to its association with U.S. foreign policy that sought to economically dominate peripheral regions of the world. The School of Foreign Service was eager to enable U.S. commercialist expansion in the aftermath of World War I. The school trained its students to view foreign lands with the keen eyes of a businessman, and while never directly advocated for military interventions abroad, it nevertheless expounded ideologies and trainings that easily rationalized such actions in the name of good business.

To return to Trouillot's *Silencing the Past*, this darker yet still nuance element of Georgetown University's and the School of Foreign Service's encourages us to reconsider the role that any American institution has in global affairs. What ideologies justify the otherwise unconscionable? What institutions encourage the comparatively powerful into enacting policies that harm those with less? Recent student protests over an Israeli Offensive Force panel at Georgetown University amidst the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip offer an especially contemporary instance of how Georgetown's relation

309 Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 31–64.

310 Ibid., 141–148; and Curran, *The Quest for Excellence*, 380.

311 Ibid., 152–157; and Walsh, "Atom Bombs and the Christian Conscience," 243–259 in *Total Empire: The Roots and Progress of World Communism* (Milwaukee, WI: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1951): 253.

312 Walsh, *Total Empire*, 252, 258.

313 McNamara, *A Catholic Cold War*, 146, 152.

314 School of Foreign Service, *SFS 100*, 17; and "Centennial Celebrations." Beaulac is mentioned in the commemorative book, but it only touches upon his contributions to interventions in Honduras. His more negative reflections on Haiti or Nicaragua are omitted.

with world affairs is no trivial manner.³¹⁵ Navigating the past of a single institution offers no sure blueprint on how to confront international affairs a century later. But at the very least, it offers the chance for the kind of introspection and self-reflection that could at least identify these flaws. ♦

315 Catherine Alaimo, Lauren Doherty, and Jack Willis, "Israeli Soldiers Panel Sparks Student, Faculty Protests," *The Hoya*, February 29, 2029, <https://thehoya.com/23131790/news/israeli-soldiers-panel-sparks-student-faculty-protests/>.

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